Security News
Brave has patched up its privacy-focused web browser after it was spotted leaking its Tor users' dark-web habits. Onion domains visited by the browser to whatever DNS servers the software was configured to use for non-Tor websites, allowing whoever operates those DNS servers - or anyone who can snoop on the queries in transit - to figure out the kinds of hidden services frequented by an individual user.
Brave Browser is fixing a privacy issue that leaks the Tor onion URL addresses you visit to your locally configured DNS server, exposing the dark web websites you visit. To access Tor onion URLs, Brave added a 'Private Window with Tor' mode that acts as a proxy to the Tor network.
UPDATE. Hot on the heels of the Emotet takedown announced Wednesday, the NetWalker ransomware has also been partially disrupted by an international police action. The Department of Justice said Wednesday that it has brought charges "Against a Canadian national in relation to NetWalker ransomware attacks," while also seizing around $454,500 in cryptocurrency from ransom payments made by three separate victims.
Researchers at Sophos noticed recently that the operators of multiple ransomware families have been using a backdoor named SystemBC, which provides attackers a connection to compromised devices and which uses the Tor anonymity network to hide command and control communications. Designed with support for the execution of commands and to allow adversaries to download and execute scripts, executables, and DLLs, the backdoor is continuously evolving, with recent samples having switched from creating a SOCKS5 proxy to using the Tor network for communication purposes.
Cybercriminals are increasingly outsourcing the task of deploying ransomware to affiliates using commodity malware and attack tools, according to new research. The SystemBC RAT has since expanded the breadth of its toolset with new characteristics that allow it to use a Tor connection to encrypt and conceal the destination of C2 communications, thus providing attackers with a persistent backdoor to launch other attacks.
The Tor Project, the research-education nonprofit organization that maintains software for the Tor anonymity network, has announced a membership program to secure funding that will allow them to "Be more agile" when it comes to software development. "Because we are a software development organization, relying only on grant funding, forces us into a development model that is slow and archaic. We can never execute solutions immediately in an agile way or experiment quickly with possible paths. We want to change that so we can respond to issues and start projects faster. And we can do that by increasing the number and amount of unrestricted contributions to the Tor Project."
More than] 23% of the Tor network's exit capacity has been attacking Tor users. So let's look quickly at how Tor works, how crooks might abuse it, and just how scary the abovementioned headline really is.
The Tor Project has confirmed someone, or some group, is in control of a large number of Bitcoin-snaffling exit nodes in its anonymizing network, and it's battling to boot them off. One observer reckons more than 23 per cent of the entire Tor network's exit capacity was under the command of one miscreant, or one group of miscreants, at one point in May, with the end goal being the theft of people's cryptocurrency.
A malicious actor was at one point in control of roughly 23% of the entire Tor network's exit capacity, a security researcher has discovered. While malicious relays on the Tor network are not something new, this was the first time that a single actor managed to control such a large number of Tor exit nodes, a Tor server operator going by the name of Nusenu reveals.
Neal Krawetz, a computer forensics expert, has published details on how to detect Tor bridge network traffic that he characterizes as "Zero-day exploits"... which the Tor Project insists are nothing of the sort. Typically, users slide into the Tor network through a publicly listed entry relay, though they may choose to join via a bridge relay, or bridge for short, to avoid IP-based detection and censorship.