Vulnerabilities > CVE-2008-3703 - Improper Authentication vulnerability in Symantec Veritas Storage Foundation 5.0/5.1

047910
CVSS 10.0 - CRITICAL
Attack vector
NETWORK
Attack complexity
LOW
Privileges required
NONE
Confidentiality impact
COMPLETE
Integrity impact
COMPLETE
Availability impact
COMPLETE
network
low complexity
symantec
CWE-287
critical
nessus
NVD
Published: 2008-08-18
Updated: 2018-10-11

Summary

The management console in the Volume Manager Scheduler Service (aka VxSchedService.exe) in Symantec Veritas Storage Foundation for Windows (SFW) 5.0, 5.0 RP1a, and 5.1 accepts NULL NTLMSSP authentication, which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via requests to the service socket that create "snapshots schedules" registry values specifying future command execution. NOTE: this issue exists because of an incomplete fix for CVE-2007-2279.

Vulnerable Configurations

Part Description Count
Application
Symantec
3

Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE)

Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC)

  • Authentication Abuse
    An attacker obtains unauthorized access to an application, service or device either through knowledge of the inherent weaknesses of an authentication mechanism, or by exploiting a flaw in the authentication scheme's implementation. In such an attack an authentication mechanism is functioning but a carefully controlled sequence of events causes the mechanism to grant access to the attacker. This attack may exploit assumptions made by the target's authentication procedures, such as assumptions regarding trust relationships or assumptions regarding the generation of secret values. This attack differs from Authentication Bypass attacks in that Authentication Abuse allows the attacker to be certified as a valid user through illegitimate means, while Authentication Bypass allows the user to access protected material without ever being certified as an authenticated user. This attack does not rely on prior sessions established by successfully authenticating users, as relied upon for the "Exploitation of Session Variables, Resource IDs and other Trusted Credentials" attack patterns.
  • Exploiting Trust in Client (aka Make the Client Invisible)
    An attack of this type exploits a programs' vulnerabilities in client/server communication channel authentication and data integrity. It leverages the implicit trust a server places in the client, or more importantly, that which the server believes is the client. An attacker executes this type of attack by placing themselves in the communication channel between client and server such that communication directly to the server is possible where the server believes it is communicating only with a valid client. There are numerous variations of this type of attack.
  • Utilizing REST's Trust in the System Resource to Register Man in the Middle
    This attack utilizes a REST(REpresentational State Transfer)-style applications' trust in the system resources and environment to place man in the middle once SSL is terminated. Rest applications premise is that they leverage existing infrastructure to deliver web services functionality. An example of this is a Rest application that uses HTTP Get methods and receives a HTTP response with an XML document. These Rest style web services are deployed on existing infrastructure such as Apache and IIS web servers with no SOAP stack required. Unfortunately from a security standpoint, there frequently is no interoperable identity security mechanism deployed, so Rest developers often fall back to SSL to deliver security. In large data centers, SSL is typically terminated at the edge of the network - at the firewall, load balancer, or router. Once the SSL is terminated the HTTP request is in the clear (unless developers have hashed or encrypted the values, but this is rare). The attacker can utilize a sniffer such as Wireshark to snapshot the credentials, such as username and password that are passed in the clear once SSL is terminated. Once the attacker gathers these credentials, they can submit requests to the web service provider just as authorized user do. There is not typically an authentication on the client side, beyond what is passed in the request itself so once this is compromised, then this is generally sufficient to compromise the service's authentication scheme.
  • Man in the Middle Attack
    This type of attack targets the communication between two components (typically client and server). The attacker places himself in the communication channel between the two components. Whenever one component attempts to communicate with the other (data flow, authentication challenges, etc.), the data first goes to the attacker, who has the opportunity to observe or alter it, and it is then passed on to the other component as if it was never intercepted. This interposition is transparent leaving the two compromised components unaware of the potential corruption or leakage of their communications. The potential for Man-in-the-Middle attacks yields an implicit lack of trust in communication or identify between two components.

Nessus

NASL familyWindows
NASL idVERITAS_STORAGE_FOUNDATION_SYM08_015.NASL
descriptionThe version of the Scheduler Service component installed as part of Veritas Storage Foundation for Windows on the remote host allows NULL NTLMSSP authentication. If requests can be sent to the TCP service listening on port 4888, a remote attacker can leverage this issue to add, modify, or delete snapshot schedules and consequently to run arbitrary code on the affected host under the context of the SYSTEM user.
last seen2020-06-01
modified2020-06-02
plugin id33900
published2008-08-15
reporterThis script is Copyright (C) 2008-2018 Tenable Network Security, Inc.
sourcehttps://www.tenable.com/plugins/nessus/33900
titleVERITAS Storage Foundation NULL NTLMSSP Authentication Bypass (SYM08-015)
code
#
#  (C) Tenable Network Security, Inc.
#


include("compat.inc");

if (description)
{
  script_id(33900);
  script_version("1.20");

  script_cve_id("CVE-2008-3703");
  script_bugtraq_id(30596);
  script_xref(name:"TRA", value:"TRA-2008-01");
  script_xref(name:"Secunia", value:"31486");

  script_name(english:"VERITAS Storage Foundation NULL NTLMSSP Authentication Bypass (SYM08-015)");
  script_summary(english:"Checks for presence of SYM08-015"); 
 
 script_set_attribute(attribute:"synopsis", value:
"Arbitrary code can be executed on the remote host." );
 script_set_attribute(attribute:"description", value:
"The version of the Scheduler Service component installed as part of
Veritas Storage Foundation for Windows on the remote host allows NULL
NTLMSSP authentication.  If requests can be sent to the TCP service
listening on port 4888, a remote attacker can leverage this issue
to add, modify, or delete snapshot schedules and consequently to run
arbitrary code on the affected host under the context of the SYSTEM
user." );
 script_set_attribute(attribute:"see_also", value:"https://www.tenable.com/security/research/tra-2008-01");
 script_set_attribute(attribute:"see_also", value:"https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-08-053/" );
 script_set_attribute(attribute:"see_also", value:"https://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/495487/30/0/threaded" );
  # http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/security/Content/2008.08.14a.html
 script_set_attribute(attribute:"see_also", value:"http://www.nessus.org/u?492d2101" );
 script_set_attribute(attribute:"solution", value:
"Apply the patch as discussed in the vendor's advisory." );
  script_set_cvss_base_vector("CVSS2#AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C");
  script_set_cvss_temporal_vector("CVSS2#E:U/RL:OF/RC:C");
  script_set_attribute(attribute:"exploitability_ease", value:"No known exploits are available");
  script_set_attribute(attribute:"exploit_available", value:"false");
 script_cwe_id(287);
 script_set_attribute(attribute:"vuln_publication_date", value: "2008/08/14");
 script_set_attribute(attribute:"patch_publication_date", value: "2008/08/14");
 script_set_attribute(attribute:"plugin_publication_date", value: "2008/08/15");
 script_cvs_date("Date: 2018/11/15 20:50:29");
script_set_attribute(attribute:"plugin_type", value:"remote");
script_set_attribute(attribute:"cpe",value:"cpe:/a:symantec:veritas_storage_foundation");
script_end_attributes();

 
  script_category(ACT_GATHER_INFO);
  script_family(english:"Windows");
  script_copyright(english:"This script is Copyright (C) 2008-2018 Tenable Network Security, Inc.");
  script_dependencies("veritas_storage_foundation_dos.nasl", "veritas_storage_foundation_bypass.nasl"); # service seems fragile for version 5.0
  script_require_keys("VERITAS/VeritasSchedulerService");
  script_require_ports(4888);

  exit(0);
}


include ("raw.inc");
include ("smb_func.inc");
include ("audit.inc");

global_var enc_arcS, enc_arcS2, enc_i, enc_j;


function initialize_key (key, constant)
{
 return MD5 (
	key +
	constant +
	raw_string(0)  # NULL end char
	);
};

function arcfour_enc_setkey (key)
{
 local_var i,j,temp;

 enc_arcS = NULL;
 for (i=0; i < 256; i++)
 {
  enc_arcS[i] = i;
  enc_arcS2[i] = ord(key[i % strlen(key)]);
 }

 j = 0;
 
 for (i=0; i < 256; i++)
 {
  j = (j + enc_arcS[i] + enc_arcS2[i]) % 256;
  temp = enc_arcS[i];
  enc_arcS[i] = enc_arcS[j];
  enc_arcS[j] = temp;
 }

 enc_i = enc_j = 0;
}


function arcfour_encrypt (data)
{
 local_var temp,t,k,output,l;

 output = NULL;
 
 for (l=0; l < strlen(data); l++)
 {
  enc_i = (enc_i+1) % 256;
  enc_j = (enc_j + enc_arcS[enc_i]) % 256;
  temp = enc_arcS[enc_i];
  enc_arcS[enc_i] = enc_arcS[enc_j];
  enc_arcS[enc_j] = temp;
  t = (enc_arcS[enc_i] + enc_arcS[enc_j]) % 256;
  k = enc_arcS[t];

  output += raw_string (k ^ ord(data[l]));
 }

 return output;
}


function initialize_ntlmssp_null()
{
 local_var key, keys;
 local_var ctssign, stcsign;
 local_var ctsseal, stcseal;

 key = crap(data:'\0', length:0x10);

 ctssign = initialize_key (key:key, constant:"session key to client-to-server signing key magic constant");
 stcsign = initialize_key (key:key, constant:"session key to server-to-client signing key magic constant");

 key = crap(data:'\0', length:0x5);

 ctsseal = initialize_key (key:key, constant:"session key to client-to-server sealing key magic constant");
 stcseal = initialize_key (key:key, constant:"session key to server-to-client sealing key magic constant");

 keys = mklist (ctssign, stcsign, ctsseal, stcseal);

 return keys;
}


function sched_sendrecv(socket, code, guid, data)
{
 local_var len;

 len = strlen(data);

 data = 
	mkdword(len) +
	mkdword(code) +
	mkdword(0) +
        guid +
	mkbyte(0) +
	data;

 send(socket:socket, data:data);
 data = recv(socket:socket, length:51, min:51);
 if (strlen(data) < 51)
   return NULL;

 len = getdword(blob:data, pos:0);
 if (len > 10000)
   return NULL;

 code = getdword(blob:data, pos:4);
 data = recv(socket:socket, length:len);

 return mklist(code,data);
}


port = get_kb_item("VERITAS/VeritasSchedulerService");
if (!port) port = 4888;

if (!get_port_state(port))
  audit(AUDIT_PORT_CLOSED, port);

soc = open_sock_tcp(port);
if (!soc) audit(AUDIT_SOCK_FAIL, port);

req = ntlmssp_negotiate_securityblob();
if(isnull(req))
  exit(1, 'Failed to create a NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE message.');

# Send NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE and wait for a response 
ret = sched_sendrecv(socket:soc, code:0x10, guid:"{c15f4527-3d6c-167b-f9c2-ca3908613b5a}", data:req);
if (isnull(ret)) 
  exit(1, "Failed to receive to a proper Veritas Scheduler message."); 

# Check response 
code = ret[0];
data = ret[1];

# VxSchedService.exe 5.0.0.297 doesn't support ntlmssp auth,
# so it's vulnerable to registry manipulations. 
if( code == 0x18)
{
  if ("-2147220973" >< data)
  {
    exit(0, 'The service listening on port ' + port + ' does not appear to ' +
      'support authentication, so it is vulnerable to registry manipulations. '+
      'It is strongly recommended that the software be upgraded.');  
  }
     
}
else 
{
  if (code != 0x20)
    audit(AUDIT_RESP_BAD, port, 'a NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE message.'); 
}

ret = ntlmssp_parse_challenge(data:data);
if (isnull(ret)) exit(1, 'Failed to parse a NTLMSSP_CHALLENGE message');

nd = ntlmssp_auth_securityblob();

# Comment out: RC4 encryption is not used
#keys = initialize_ntlmssp_null();
#sid = 0;
#arcfour_enc_setkey (key:keys[2]);
#arcfour_dec_setkey (key:keys[3]);

req = nd[1];
if(isnull(req))
  exit(1, 'Failed to create a NTLMSSP_AUTHENTICATION message.');

filter = "src host " + get_host_ip() + " and src port " + port + " and dst port " + get_source_port(soc) + " and tcp";
bpf = bpf_open(filter);
if(! bpf) audit(AUDIT_FN_FAIL, 'bpf_open');
srv_close = FALSE;

# Send NTLMSSP_AUTHENTICATION with NULL credentials
# and wait for a response
ret = sched_sendrecv(socket:soc, code:0x10, guid:"{c15f4527-3d6c-167b-f9c2-ca3908613b5a}", data:req);

# For both vulnerable and patched servers, AcceptSecurityContext() should 
# return SEC_E_OK
if (isnull(ret))
  audit(AUDIT_RESP_NOT, port, 'a NTLMSSP_AUTHENTICATION message'); 
 
if(ret[0] != 0x20 || isnull(ret[1]))
  audit(AUDIT_RESP_BAD, port, 'a NTLMSSP_AUTHENTICATION message'); 

ret = ntlmssp_parse_response(data:ret[1]);
if (!isnull(ret) && (ret == 0)) # Accept Completed
{

 # Collect packets for a period of time 
 pkts = make_list(); 
 i = 0;
 then = unixtime(); 
 repeat {
    ret = bpf_next(bpf:bpf);  
    if(ret) pkts[i++] = ret;
 } until((unixtime() - then) >= 5);

 if(max_index(pkts) < 1) exit(1, 'No packets captured.');

 # Check if server closed the connection
 foreach p (pkts)
 {
   ret = substr(p, strlen(link_layer())); 
   pkt = packet_split(ret);
   tcp = pkt[1];

   tcp = tcp["data"];
   if ((tcp["th_flags"] & (TH_FIN|TH_RST )))
   {
    srv_close = TRUE;
    break;
   }
 } 

 # After a NULL session is established, the vulnerable server
 # waits for more incoming messages, so it doesn't close the connection  
 if(! srv_close) security_hole(port);
 # Patched server checks if the established session is a NULL session,
 # if it is, it closes the connection
 else audit(AUDIT_HOST_NOT, 'affected');
}
else exit(1, 'Nessus could not establish a NULL NTLMSSP session with remote host.');

References