Security News > 2022 > June > Hidden Anti-Cryptography Provisions in Internet Anti-Trust Bills
Both bills have provisions that could be used to break end-to-end encryption.
3(c)(7)(A)(iii) would allow a company to deny access to apps installed by users, where those app makers "Have been identified as national security, intelligence, or law enforcement risks." That language is far too broad. It would allow Apple to deny access to an encryption service provider that provides encrypted cloud backups to the cloud.
The word "Solely" suggests that offering end-to-end encryption could be a factor in determining liability, provided that it is not the only reason.
Again, the FBI's repeated statements about end-to-end encryption could serve as support.
Sec 7.(B) contains language specifying that the bill does not "Require a covered company to interoperate or share data with persons or business users thathave been identified by the Federal Government as national security, intelligence, or law enforcement risks." This would mean that Apple could ignore the prohibition against private APIs, and deny access to otherwise private APIs, for developers of encryption products that have been publicly identified by the FBI. That is, end-to-end encryption products.
I want those bills to pass, but I want those provisions cleared up so we don't lose strong end-to-end encryption in our attempt to reign in the tech monopolies.