Vulnerabilities > Ieee
DATE | CVE | VULNERABILITY TITLE | RISK |
---|---|---|---|
2023-04-15 | CVE-2022-47522 | Authentication Bypass by Spoofing vulnerability in multiple products The IEEE 802.11 specifications through 802.11ax allow physically proximate attackers to intercept (possibly cleartext) target-destined frames by spoofing a target's MAC address, sending Power Save frames to the access point, and then sending other frames to the access point (such as authentication frames or re-association frames) to remove the target's original security context. | 7.5 |
2022-09-27 | CVE-2021-27854 | Authentication Bypass by Spoofing vulnerability in multiple products Layer 2 network filtering capabilities such as IPv6 RA guard can be bypassed using combinations of VLAN 0 headers, LLC/SNAP headers, and converting frames from Ethernet to Wifi and its reverse. | 4.7 |
2022-09-27 | CVE-2021-27861 | Authentication Bypass by Spoofing vulnerability in multiple products Layer 2 network filtering capabilities such as IPv6 RA guard can be bypassed using LLC/SNAP headers with invalid length (and optionally VLAN0 headers) | 4.7 |
2022-09-27 | CVE-2021-27862 | Authentication Bypass by Spoofing vulnerability in multiple products Layer 2 network filtering capabilities such as IPv6 RA guard can be bypassed using LLC/SNAP headers with invalid length and Ethernet to Wifi frame conversion (and optionally VLAN0 headers). | 4.7 |
2022-09-27 | CVE-2021-27853 | Authentication Bypass by Spoofing vulnerability in multiple products Layer 2 network filtering capabilities such as IPv6 RA guard or ARP inspection can be bypassed using combinations of VLAN 0 headers and LLC/SNAP headers. | 4.7 |
2021-05-11 | CVE-2020-24586 | The 802.11 standard that underpins Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA, WPA2, and WPA3) and Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) doesn't require that received fragments be cleared from memory after (re)connecting to a network. | 3.5 |
2021-05-11 | CVE-2020-24587 | Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm vulnerability in multiple products The 802.11 standard that underpins Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA, WPA2, and WPA3) and Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) doesn't require that all fragments of a frame are encrypted under the same key. | 2.6 |
2021-05-11 | CVE-2020-24588 | Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm vulnerability in multiple products The 802.11 standard that underpins Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA, WPA2, and WPA3) and Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) doesn't require that the A-MSDU flag in the plaintext QoS header field is authenticated. | 3.5 |