Vulnerabilities > CVE-2024-38272 - Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay vulnerability in Google Nearby

047910
CVSS 4.3 - MEDIUM
Attack vector
ADJACENT_NETWORK
Attack complexity
LOW
Privileges required
NONE
Confidentiality impact
NONE
Integrity impact
LOW
Availability impact
NONE
low complexity
google
CWE-294

Summary

There exists a vulnerability in Quick Share/Nearby, where an attacker can bypass the accept file dialog on Quick Share Windows. Normally in Quick Share Windows app we can't send a file without the user accept from the receiving device if the visibility is set to everyone mode or contacts mode. We recommend upgrading to version 1.0.1724.0 of Quick Share or above

Vulnerable Configurations

Part Description Count
Application
Google
1

Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE)

Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC)

  • Session Sidejacking
    Session sidejacking takes advantage of an unencrypted communication channel between a victim and target system. The attacker sniffs traffic on a network looking for session tokens in unencrypted traffic. Once a session token is captured, the attacker performs malicious actions by using the stolen token with the targeted application to impersonate the victim. This attack is a specific method of session hijacking, which is exploiting a valid session token to gain unauthorized access to a target system or information. Other methods to perform a session hijacking are session fixation, cross-site scripting, or compromising a user or server machine and stealing the session token.
  • Reusing Session IDs (aka Session Replay)
    This attack targets the reuse of valid session ID to spoof the target system in order to gain privileges. The attacker tries to reuse a stolen session ID used previously during a transaction to perform spoofing and session hijacking. Another name for this type of attack is Session Replay.
  • Man in the Middle Attack
    This type of attack targets the communication between two components (typically client and server). The attacker places himself in the communication channel between the two components. Whenever one component attempts to communicate with the other (data flow, authentication challenges, etc.), the data first goes to the attacker, who has the opportunity to observe or alter it, and it is then passed on to the other component as if it was never intercepted. This interposition is transparent leaving the two compromised components unaware of the potential corruption or leakage of their communications. The potential for Man-in-the-Middle attacks yields an implicit lack of trust in communication or identify between two components.