Vulnerabilities > CVE-2023-49284 - Interpretation Conflict vulnerability in Fishshell Fish
Summary
fish is a smart and user-friendly command line shell for macOS, Linux, and the rest of the family. fish shell uses certain Unicode non-characters internally for marking wildcards and expansions. It will incorrectly allow these markers to be read on command substitution output, rather than transforming them into a safe internal representation. While this may cause unexpected behavior with direct input (for example, echo \UFDD2HOME has the same output as echo $HOME), this may become a minor security problem if the output is being fed from an external program into a command substitution where this output may not be expected. This design flaw was introduced in very early versions of fish, predating the version control system, and is thought to be present in every version of fish released in the last 15 years or more, although with different characters. Code execution does not appear to be possible, but denial of service (through large brace expansion) or information disclosure (such as variable expansion) is potentially possible under certain circumstances. fish shell 3.6.2 has been released to correct this issue. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability.
Vulnerable Configurations
Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE)
Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC)
- HTTP Request Splitting HTTP Request Splitting (also known as HTTP Request Smuggling) is an attack pattern where an attacker attempts to insert additional HTTP requests in the body of the original (enveloping) HTTP request in such a way that the browser interprets it as one request but the web server interprets it as two. There are several ways to perform HTTP request splitting attacks. One way is to include double Content-Length headers in the request to exploit the fact that the devices parsing the request may each use a different header. Another way is to submit an HTTP request with a "Transfer Encoding: chunked" in the request header set with setRequestHeader to allow a payload in the HTTP Request that can be considered as another HTTP Request by a subsequent parsing entity. A third way is to use the "Double CR in an HTTP header" technique. There are also a few less general techniques targeting specific parsing vulnerabilities in certain web servers.
- HTTP Response Smuggling An attacker injects content into a server response that is interpreted differently by intermediaries than it is by the target browser. To do this, it takes advantage of inconsistent or incorrect interpretations of the HTTP protocol by various applications. For example, it might use different block terminating characters (CR or LF alone), adding duplicate header fields that browsers interpret as belonging to separate responses, or other techniques. Consequences of this attack can include response-splitting, cross-site scripting, apparent defacement of targeted sites, cache poisoning, or similar actions.
- HTTP Request Smuggling HTTP Request Smuggling results from the discrepancies in parsing HTTP requests between HTTP entities such as web caching proxies or application firewalls. Entities such as web servers, web caching proxies, application firewalls or simple proxies often parse HTTP requests in slightly different ways. Under specific situations where there are two or more such entities in the path of the HTTP request, a specially crafted request is seen by two attacked entities as two different sets of requests. This allows certain requests to be smuggled through to a second entity without the first one realizing it.