Vulnerabilities > CVE-2023-45814 - Missing Release of Resource after Effective Lifetime vulnerability in Littlebigfresh Bunkum 4.0

047910
CVSS 5.3 - MEDIUM
Attack vector
NETWORK
Attack complexity
LOW
Privileges required
NONE
Confidentiality impact
LOW
Integrity impact
NONE
Availability impact
NONE
network
low complexity
littlebigfresh
CWE-772

Summary

Bunkum is an open-source protocol-agnostic request server for custom game servers. First, a little bit of background. So, in the beginning, Bunkum's `AuthenticationService` only supported injecting `IUser`s. However, as Refresh and SoundShapesServer implemented permissions systems support for injecting `IToken`s into endpoints was added. All was well until 4.0. Bunkum 4.0 then changed to enforce relations between `IToken`s and `IUser`s. This wasn't implemented in a very good way in the `AuthenticationService`, and ended up breaking caching in such a way that cached tokens would persist after the lifetime of the request - since we tried to cache both tokens and users. From that point until now, from what I understand, Bunkum was attempting to use that cached token at the start of the next request once cached. Naturally, when that token expired, downstream projects like Refresh would remove the object from Realm - and cause the object in the cache to be in a detached state, causing an exception from invalid use of `IToken.User`. So in other words, a use-after-free since Realm can't manage the lifetime of the cached token. Security-wise, the scope is fairly limited, can only be pulled off on a couple endpoints given a few conditions, and you can't guarantee which token you're going to get. Also, the token *would* get invalidated properly if the endpoint had either a `IToken` usage or a `IUser` usage. The fix is to just wipe the token cache after the request was handled, which is now in `4.2.1`. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability.

Vulnerable Configurations

Part Description Count
Application
Littlebigfresh
1

Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC)

  • HTTP DoS
    An attacker performs flooding at the HTTP level to bring down only a particular web application rather than anything listening on a TCP/IP connection. This denial of service attack requires substantially fewer packets to be sent which makes DoS harder to detect. This is an equivalent of SYN flood in HTTP. The idea is to keep the HTTP session alive indefinitely and then repeat that hundreds of times. This attack targets resource depletion weaknesses in web server software. The web server will wait to attacker's responses on the initiated HTTP sessions while the connection threads are being exhausted.