Vulnerabilities > CVE-2023-44319 - Reversible One-Way Hash vulnerability in Siemens products
Summary
A vulnerability has been identified in RUGGEDCOM RM1224 LTE(4G) EU (6GK6108-4AM00-2BA2) (All versions < V8.0), RUGGEDCOM RM1224 LTE(4G) NAM (6GK6108-4AM00-2DA2) (All versions < V8.0), SCALANCE M804PB (6GK5804-0AP00-2AA2) (All versions < V8.0), SCALANCE M812-1 ADSL-Router (6GK5812-1AA00-2AA2) (All versions < V8.0), SCALANCE M812-1 ADSL-Router (6GK5812-1BA00-2AA2) (All versions < V8.0), SCALANCE M816-1 ADSL-Router (6GK5816-1AA00-2AA2) (All versions < V8.0), SCALANCE M816-1 ADSL-Router (6GK5816-1BA00-2AA2) (All versions < V8.0), SCALANCE M826-2 SHDSL-Router (6GK5826-2AB00-2AB2) (All versions < V8.0), SCALANCE M874-2 (6GK5874-2AA00-2AA2) (All versions < V8.0), SCALANCE M874-3 (6GK5874-3AA00-2AA2) (All versions < V8.0), SCALANCE M876-3 (6GK5876-3AA02-2BA2) (All versions < V8.0), SCALANCE M876-3 (ROK) (6GK5876-3AA02-2EA2) (All versions < V8.0), SCALANCE M876-4 (6GK5876-4AA10-2BA2) (All versions < V8.0), SCALANCE M876-4 (EU) (6GK5876-4AA00-2BA2) (All versions < V8.0), SCALANCE M876-4 (NAM) (6GK5876-4AA00-2DA2) (All versions < V8.0), SCALANCE MUM853-1 (EU) (6GK5853-2EA00-2DA1) (All versions < V8.0), SCALANCE MUM856-1 (EU) (6GK5856-2EA00-3DA1) (All versions < V8.0), SCALANCE MUM856-1 (RoW) (6GK5856-2EA00-3AA1) (All versions < V8.0), SCALANCE S615 EEC LAN-Router (6GK5615-0AA01-2AA2) (All versions < V8.0), SCALANCE S615 LAN-Router (6GK5615-0AA00-2AA2) (All versions < V8.0), SCALANCE WAB762-1 (6GK5762-1AJ00-6AA0) (All versions), SCALANCE WAM763-1 (6GK5763-1AL00-7DA0) (All versions), SCALANCE WAM763-1 (ME) (6GK5763-1AL00-7DC0) (All versions), SCALANCE WAM763-1 (US) (6GK5763-1AL00-7DB0) (All versions), SCALANCE WAM766-1 (EU) (6GK5766-1GE00-7DA0) (All versions), SCALANCE WAM766-1 (ME) (6GK5766-1GE00-7DC0) (All versions), SCALANCE WAM766-1 (US) (6GK5766-1GE00-7DB0) (All versions), SCALANCE WAM766-1 EEC (EU) (6GK5766-1GE00-7TA0) (All versions), SCALANCE WAM766-1 EEC (ME) (6GK5766-1GE00-7TC0) (All versions), SCALANCE WAM766-1 EEC (US) (6GK5766-1GE00-7TB0) (All versions), SCALANCE WUB762-1 (6GK5762-1AJ00-1AA0) (All versions), SCALANCE WUB762-1 (6GK5762-1AJ00-2AA0) (All versions), SCALANCE WUM763-1 (6GK5763-1AL00-3AA0) (All versions), SCALANCE WUM763-1 (6GK5763-1AL00-3DA0) (All versions), SCALANCE WUM763-1 (US) (6GK5763-1AL00-3AB0) (All versions), SCALANCE WUM763-1 (US) (6GK5763-1AL00-3DB0) (All versions), SCALANCE WUM766-1 (EU) (6GK5766-1GE00-3DA0) (All versions), SCALANCE WUM766-1 (ME) (6GK5766-1GE00-3DC0) (All versions), SCALANCE WUM766-1 (US) (6GK5766-1GE00-3DB0) (All versions). Affected devices use a weak checksum algorithm to protect the configuration backup that an administrator can export from the device. This could allow an authenticated attacker with administrative privileges or an attacker that tricks a legitimate administrator to upload a modified configuration file to change the configuration of an affected device.
Vulnerable Configurations
Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE)
Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC)
- Web Services API Signature Forgery Leveraging Hash Function Extension Weakness When web services require callees to authenticate, they sometimes issue a token / secret to the caller that the caller is to use to sign their web service calls. In one such scheme the caller when constructing a request would concatenate all of the parameters passed to the web service with the provided authentication token and then generate a hash of the concatenated string (e.g., MD5, SHA1, etc.). That hash then forms the signature that is passed to the web service which is used on the server side to verify the origin authenticity and integrity of the message. There is a practical attack against an authentication scheme of this nature that makes use of the hash function extension / padding weakness. Leveraging this weakness, an attacker, who does not know the secret token, is able to modify the parameters passed to the web service by generating their own call and still generate a legitimate signature hash. For instance, consider the message to be passed to the web service is M (this message includes the parameters passed to the web service concatenated with the secret token / key bytes). The message M is hashed and that hash is passed to the web service and is used for authentication. The attacker does not know M, but can see Hash (M) and Length (M). The attacker can then compute Hash (M || Padding (M) II M') for any M'. The attacker does not know the entire message M, specifically the attacker does not know the secret bytes, but that does not matter. The attacker is still able to sign their own message M' and make the called web service verify the integrity of the message without an error. Because of the iterative design of the hash function, it is possible, from only the hash of a message and its length, to compute the hash of longer messages that start with the initial message and include the padding required for the initial message to reach a multiple of 512 bits. It is important to note that the attack not limited to MD5 and will work just as well with another hash function like SHA1.
- Subvert Code-signing Facilities Because languages use code signing facilities to vouch for code's identity and to thus tie code to its assigned privileges within an environment, subverting this mechanism can be instrumental in an attacker escalating privilege. Any means of subverting the way that a virtual machine enforces code signing classifies for this style of attack. This pattern does not include circumstances through which a signing key has been stolen.
References
- https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/pdf/ssa-699386.pdf
- https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/pdf/ssa-180704.pdf
- https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/html/ssa-699386.html
- https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/html/ssa-180704.html
- https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/html/ssa-602936.html
- https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/html/ssa-690517.html