Vulnerabilities > CVE-2022-32156 - Improper Certificate Validation vulnerability in Splunk

CVSS 8.1 - HIGH

Attack vector

NETWORK

Attack complexity

HIGH

Privileges required

NONE

Confidentiality impact

HIGH

Integrity impact

HIGH

Availability impact

HIGH

network

high complexity

splunk

CWE-295

NVD

Published: 2022-06-15

Updated: 2024-11-21

Summary

In Splunk Enterprise and Universal Forwarder versions before 9.0, the Splunk command-line interface (CLI) did not validate TLS certificates while connecting to a remote Splunk platform instance by default. After updating to version 9.0, see Configure TLS host name validation for the Splunk CLI https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/Splunk/9.0.0/Security/EnableTLSCertHostnameValidation#Configure_TLS_host_name_validation_for_the_Splunk_CLI to enable the remediation. The vulnerability does not affect the Splunk Cloud Platform. At the time of publishing, we have no evidence of exploitation of this vulnerability by external parties. The issue requires conditions beyond the control of a potential bad actor such as a machine-in-the-middle attack. Hence, Splunk rates the complexity of the attack as High.

Vulnerable Configurations

Part	Description	Count
Application	Splunk Splunk Splunk 4.3 Splunk Splunk 4.3.0 Splunk Splunk 4.3.1 Splunk Splunk 4.3.2 Splunk Splunk 4.3.3 Splunk Splunk 4.3.4 Splunk Splunk 4.3.5 Splunk Splunk 4.3.6 Splunk Splunk 4.3.7 Splunk Splunk 5.0.0 Splunk Splunk 5.0.1 Splunk Splunk 5.0.2 Splunk Splunk 5.0.3 Splunk Splunk 5.0.4 Splunk Splunk 5.0.5 Splunk Splunk 5.0.6 Splunk Splunk 5.0.7 Splunk Splunk 5.0.8 Splunk Splunk 5.0.9 Splunk Splunk 5.0.10 Splunk Splunk 5.0.11 Splunk Splunk 5.0.12 Splunk Splunk 5.0.13 Splunk Splunk 5.0.14 Splunk Splunk 5.0.15 Splunk Splunk 5.0.16 Splunk Splunk 5.0.17 Splunk Splunk 5.0.18 Splunk Splunk 6.0.0 Splunk Splunk 6.0.1 Splunk Splunk 6.0.2 Splunk Splunk 6.0.3 Splunk Splunk 6.0.4 Splunk Splunk 6.0.5 Splunk Splunk 6.0.6 Splunk Splunk 6.0.7 Splunk Splunk 6.0.8 Splunk Splunk 6.0.9 Splunk Splunk 6.0.10 Splunk Splunk 6.0.11 Splunk Splunk 6.0.12 Splunk Splunk 6.0.13 Splunk Splunk 6.0.14 Splunk Splunk 6.0.15 Splunk Splunk 6.1.0 Splunk Splunk 6.1.1 Splunk Splunk 6.1.2 Splunk Splunk 6.1.3 Splunk Splunk 6.1.4 Splunk Splunk 6.1.5 Splunk Splunk 6.1.6 Splunk Splunk 6.1.7 Splunk Splunk 6.1.8 Splunk Splunk 6.1.9 Splunk Splunk 6.1.10 Splunk Splunk 6.1.11 Splunk Splunk 6.1.12 Splunk Splunk 6.1.13 Splunk Splunk 6.1.14 Splunk Splunk 6.2.0 Splunk Splunk 6.2.1 Splunk Splunk 6.2.2 Splunk Splunk 6.2.3 Splunk Splunk 6.2.4 Splunk Splunk 6.2.5 Splunk Splunk 6.2.6 Splunk Splunk 6.2.7 Splunk Splunk 6.2.8 Splunk Splunk 6.2.9 Splunk Splunk 6.2.10 Splunk Splunk 6.2.11 Splunk Splunk 6.2.12 Splunk Splunk 6.2.13 Splunk Splunk 6.2.14 Splunk Splunk 6.2.15 Splunk Splunk 6.3.0 Splunk Splunk 6.3.1 Splunk Splunk 6.3.2 Splunk Splunk 6.3.3 Splunk Splunk 6.3.4 Splunk Splunk 6.3.5 Splunk Splunk 6.3.6 Splunk Splunk 6.3.7 Splunk Splunk 6.3.8 Splunk Splunk 6.3.9 Splunk Splunk 6.3.10 Splunk Splunk 6.3.11 Splunk Splunk 6.3.12 Splunk Splunk 6.3.13 Splunk Splunk 6.3.14 Splunk Splunk 6.4.0 Splunk Splunk 6.4.1 Splunk Splunk 6.4.2 Splunk Splunk 6.4.3 Splunk Splunk 6.4.4 Splunk Splunk 6.4.5 Splunk Splunk 6.4.6 Splunk Splunk 6.4.7 Splunk Splunk 6.4.8 Splunk Splunk 6.4.9 Splunk Splunk 6.4.10 Splunk Splunk 6.4.11 Splunk Splunk 6.5.0 Splunk Splunk 6.5.1 Splunk Splunk 6.5.2 Splunk Splunk 6.5.3 Splunk Splunk 6.5.4 Splunk Splunk 6.5.5 Splunk Splunk 6.5.6 Splunk Splunk 6.5.7 Splunk Splunk 6.5.8 Splunk Splunk 6.5.9 Splunk Splunk 6.5.10 Splunk Splunk 6.6.0 Splunk Splunk 6.6.1 Splunk Splunk 6.6.2 Splunk Splunk 6.6.3 Splunk Splunk 6.6.4 Splunk Splunk 6.6.5 Splunk Splunk 6.6.6 Splunk Splunk 6.6.7 Splunk Splunk 6.6.8 Splunk Splunk 6.6.9 Splunk Splunk 6.6.10 Splunk Splunk 6.6.11 Splunk Splunk 6.6.12 Splunk Splunk 7.0.0 Splunk Splunk 7.0.1 Splunk Splunk 7.0.2 Splunk Splunk 7.0.3 Splunk Splunk 7.0.4 Splunk Splunk 7.0.5 Splunk Splunk 7.0.6 Splunk Splunk 7.0.7 Splunk Splunk 7.0.8 Splunk Splunk 7.0.9 Splunk Splunk 7.1.0 Splunk Splunk 7.1.1 Splunk Splunk 7.1.2 Splunk Splunk 7.1.3 Splunk Splunk 7.1.4 Splunk Splunk 7.1.5 Splunk Splunk 7.1.6 Splunk Splunk 7.2.0 Splunk Splunk 7.2.1 Splunk Splunk 7.2.2 Splunk Splunk 7.2.3 Splunk Splunk 7.2.4 Splunk Splunk 7.2.5 Splunk Splunk 8.1.0 Splunk Splunk 8.1.1 Splunk Splunk 8.1.2 Splunk Splunk 8.1.4 Splunk Splunk 8.1.5 Splunk Splunk 8.1.6 Splunk Splunk 8.1.7 Splunk Splunk 8.1.12 Splunk Splunk 8.1.13 Splunk Splunk 8.2.0 Splunk Splunk 8.2.9 Splunk Splunk 8.2.10 Splunk Splunk 8.2.12 Splunk Universal Forwarder 4.2.3.105575 Splunk Universal Forwarder 4.2.4.110225 Splunk Universal Forwarder 8.2.0 Splunk Universal Forwarder 8.2.6 Splunk Universal Forwarder 8.2.7 Splunk Universal Forwarder 8.2.8 Splunk Universal Forwarder 8.2.9 Splunk Universal Forwarder 8.2.10 Splunk Universal Forwarder 8.2.11 Splunk Universal Forwarder 8.2.12	172

Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE)

CWE-295 - Improper Certificate Validation

Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC)

Creating a Rogue Certificate Authority Certificate
An attacker exploits a weakness in the MD5 hash algorithm (weak collision resistance) to generate a certificate signing request (CSR) that contains collision blocks in the "to be signed" part. The attacker specially crafts two different, but valid X.509 certificates that when hashed with the MD5 algorithm would yield the same value. The attacker then sends the CSR for one of the certificates to the Certification Authority which uses the MD5 hashing algorithm. That request is completely valid and the Certificate Authority issues an X.509 certificate to the attacker which is signed with its private key. An attacker then takes that signed blob and inserts it into another X.509 certificate that the attacker generated. Due to the MD5 collision, both certificates, though different, hash to the same value and so the signed blob works just as well in the second certificate. The net effect is that the attackers' second X.509 certificate, which the Certification Authority has never seen, is now signed and validated by that Certification Authority. To make the attack more interesting, the second certificate could be not just a regular certificate, but rather itself a signing certificate. Thus the attacker is able to start their own Certification Authority that is anchored in its root of trust in the legitimate Certification Authority that has signed the attackers' first X.509 certificate. If the original Certificate Authority was accepted by default by browsers, so will now the Certificate Authority set up by the attacker and of course any certificates that it signs. So the attacker is now able to generate any SSL certificates to impersonate any web server, and the user's browser will not issue any warning to the victim. This can be used to compromise HTTPS communications and other types of systems where PKI and X.509 certificates may be used (e.g., VPN, IPSec) .

Summary

Vulnerable Configurations

Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE)

Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC)

References