Vulnerabilities > CVE-2022-1834 - Improper Certificate Validation vulnerability in Mozilla Thunderbird

047910
CVSS 6.5 - MEDIUM
Attack vector
NETWORK
Attack complexity
LOW
Privileges required
NONE
Confidentiality impact
HIGH
Integrity impact
NONE
Availability impact
NONE
network
low complexity
mozilla
CWE-295

Summary

When displaying the sender of an email, and the sender name contained the Braille Pattern Blank space character multiple times, Thunderbird would have displayed all the spaces. This could have been used by an attacker to send an email message with the attacker's digital signature, that was shown with an arbitrary sender email address chosen by the attacker. If the sender name started with a false email address, followed by many Braille space characters, the attacker's email address was not visible. Because Thunderbird compared the invisible sender address with the signature's email address, if the signing key or certificate was accepted by Thunderbird, the email was shown as having a valid digital signature. This vulnerability affects Thunderbird < 91.10.

Vulnerable Configurations

Part Description Count
Application
Mozilla
453

Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE)

Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC)

  • Creating a Rogue Certificate Authority Certificate
    An attacker exploits a weakness in the MD5 hash algorithm (weak collision resistance) to generate a certificate signing request (CSR) that contains collision blocks in the "to be signed" part. The attacker specially crafts two different, but valid X.509 certificates that when hashed with the MD5 algorithm would yield the same value. The attacker then sends the CSR for one of the certificates to the Certification Authority which uses the MD5 hashing algorithm. That request is completely valid and the Certificate Authority issues an X.509 certificate to the attacker which is signed with its private key. An attacker then takes that signed blob and inserts it into another X.509 certificate that the attacker generated. Due to the MD5 collision, both certificates, though different, hash to the same value and so the signed blob works just as well in the second certificate. The net effect is that the attackers' second X.509 certificate, which the Certification Authority has never seen, is now signed and validated by that Certification Authority. To make the attack more interesting, the second certificate could be not just a regular certificate, but rather itself a signing certificate. Thus the attacker is able to start their own Certification Authority that is anchored in its root of trust in the legitimate Certification Authority that has signed the attackers' first X.509 certificate. If the original Certificate Authority was accepted by default by browsers, so will now the Certificate Authority set up by the attacker and of course any certificates that it signs. So the attacker is now able to generate any SSL certificates to impersonate any web server, and the user's browser will not issue any warning to the victim. This can be used to compromise HTTPS communications and other types of systems where PKI and X.509 certificates may be used (e.g., VPN, IPSec) .