Vulnerabilities > CVE-2017-8404 - Command Injection vulnerability in Dlink Dcs-1130 Firmware

047910
CVSS 9.8 - CRITICAL
Attack vector
NETWORK
Attack complexity
LOW
Privileges required
NONE
Confidentiality impact
HIGH
Integrity impact
HIGH
Availability impact
HIGH
network
low complexity
dlink
CWE-77
critical
NVD
Published: 2019-07-02
Updated: 2024-11-21

Summary

An issue was discovered on D-Link DCS-1130 devices. The device provides a user with the capability of setting a SMB folder for the video clippings recorded by the device. It seems that the POST parameters passed in this request (to test if email credentials and hostname sent to the device work properly) result in being passed as commands to a "system" API in the function and thus result in command injection on the device. If the firmware version is dissected using binwalk tool, we obtain a cramfs-root archive which contains the filesystem set up on the device that contains all the binaries. The library "libmailutils.so" is the one that has the vulnerable function "sub_1FC4" that receives the values sent by the POST request. If we open this binary in IDA-pro we will notice that this follows an ARM little endian format. The function sub_1FC4 in IDA pro is identified to be receiving the values sent in the POST request and the value set in POST parameter "receiver1" is extracted in function "sub_15AC" which is then passed to the vulnerable system API call. The vulnerable library function is accessed in "cgibox" binary at address 0x0008F598 which calls the "mailLoginTest" function in "libmailutils.so" binary as shown below which results in the vulnerable POST parameter being passed to the library which results in the command injection issue.

Vulnerable Configurations

Part Description Count
OS
Dlink
1
Hardware
Dlink
1

Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE)

Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC)

  • Cause Web Server Misclassification
    An attack of this type exploits a Web server's decision to take action based on filename or file extension. Because different file types are handled by different server processes, misclassification may force the Web server to take unexpected action, or expected actions in an unexpected sequence. This may cause the server to exhaust resources, supply debug or system data to the attacker, or bind an attacker to a remote process. This type of vulnerability has been found in many widely used servers including IIS, Lotus Domino, and Orion. The attacker's job in this case is straightforward, standard communication protocols and methods are used and are generally appended with malicious information at the tail end of an otherwise legitimate request. The attack payload varies, but it could be special characters like a period or simply appending a tag that has a special meaning for operations on the server side like .jsp for a java application server. The essence of this attack is that the attacker deceives the server into executing functionality based on the name of the request, i.e. login.jsp, not the contents.
  • LDAP Injection
    An attacker manipulates or crafts an LDAP query for the purpose of undermining the security of the target. Some applications use user input to create LDAP queries that are processed by an LDAP server. For example, a user might provide their username during authentication and the username might be inserted in an LDAP query during the authentication process. An attacker could use this input to inject additional commands into an LDAP query that could disclose sensitive information. For example, entering a * in the aforementioned query might return information about all users on the system. This attack is very similar to an SQL injection attack in that it manipulates a query to gather additional information or coerce a particular return value.
  • Command Delimiters
    An attack of this type exploits a programs' vulnerabilities that allows an attacker's commands to be concatenated onto a legitimate command with the intent of targeting other resources such as the file system or database. The system that uses a filter or a blacklist input validation, as opposed to whitelist validation is vulnerable to an attacker who predicts delimiters (or combinations of delimiters) not present in the filter or blacklist. As with other injection attacks, the attacker uses the command delimiter payload as an entry point to tunnel through the application and activate additional attacks through SQL queries, shell commands, network scanning, and so on.
  • File System Function Injection, Content Based
    An attack of this type exploits the host's trust in executing remote content including binary files. The files are poisoned with a malicious payload (targeting the file systems accessible by the target software) by the attacker and may be passed through standard channels such as via email, and standard web content like PDF and multimedia files. The attacker exploits known vulnerabilities or handling routines in the target processes. Vulnerabilities of this type have been found in a wide variety of commercial applications from Microsoft Office to Adobe Acrobat and Apple Safari web browser. When the attacker knows the standard handling routines and can identify vulnerabilities and entry points they can be exploited by otherwise seemingly normal content. Once the attack is executed, the attackers' program can access relative directories such as C:\Program Files or other standard system directories to launch further attacks. In a worst case scenario, these programs are combined with other propagation logic and work as a virus.
  • Exploiting Multiple Input Interpretation Layers
    An attacker supplies the target software with input data that contains sequences of special characters designed to bypass input validation logic. This exploit relies on the target making multiples passes over the input data and processing a "layer" of special characters with each pass. In this manner, the attacker can disguise input that would otherwise be rejected as invalid by concealing it with layers of special/escape characters that are stripped off by subsequent processing steps. The goal is to first discover cases where the input validation layer executes before one or more parsing layers. That is, user input may go through the following logic in an application: In such cases, the attacker will need to provide input that will pass through the input validator, but after passing through parser2, will be converted into something that the input validator was supposed to stop.

References