Vulnerabilities > CVE-2017-6975 - Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer vulnerability in Apple Iphone OS
Attack vector
PHYSICAL Attack complexity
LOW Privileges required
NONE Confidentiality impact
HIGH Integrity impact
HIGH Availability impact
HIGH Summary
Wi-Fi in Apple iOS before 10.3.1 does not prevent CVE-2017-6956 stack buffer overflow exploitation via a crafted access point. NOTE: because an operating system could potentially isolate itself from CVE-2017-6956 exploitation without patching Broadcom firmware functions, there is a separate CVE ID for the operating-system behavior.
Vulnerable Configurations
Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE)
Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC)
- Buffer Overflow via Environment Variables This attack pattern involves causing a buffer overflow through manipulation of environment variables. Once the attacker finds that they can modify an environment variable, they may try to overflow associated buffers. This attack leverages implicit trust often placed in environment variables.
- Overflow Buffers Buffer Overflow attacks target improper or missing bounds checking on buffer operations, typically triggered by input injected by an attacker. As a consequence, an attacker is able to write past the boundaries of allocated buffer regions in memory, causing a program crash or potentially redirection of execution as per the attackers' choice.
- Client-side Injection-induced Buffer Overflow This type of attack exploits a buffer overflow vulnerability in targeted client software through injection of malicious content from a custom-built hostile service.
- Filter Failure through Buffer Overflow In this attack, the idea is to cause an active filter to fail by causing an oversized transaction. An attacker may try to feed overly long input strings to the program in an attempt to overwhelm the filter (by causing a buffer overflow) and hoping that the filter does not fail securely (i.e. the user input is let into the system unfiltered).
- MIME Conversion An attacker exploits a weakness in the MIME conversion routine to cause a buffer overflow and gain control over the mail server machine. The MIME system is designed to allow various different information formats to be interpreted and sent via e-mail. Attack points exist when data are converted to MIME compatible format and back.
Seebug
bulletinFamily exploit description **Detailed analysis of reference** : the * https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.tw/2017/04/over-air-exploiting-broadcoms-wi-fi_4.html the first part * https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.tw/2017/04/over-air-exploiting-broadcoms-wi-fi_11.html Part II Broadcom produces the Wi-Fi HardMAC SoCs which are used to handle the PHY and MAC layer processing. These chips are present in both mobile devices and Wi-Fi routers, and are capable of handling many Wi-Fi related events without delegating to the host OS. In order to allow fast roaming between access points in a wireless network, the Broadcom firmware supports the Fast BSS Transition feature (the IEEE 802.11 r-2008 FT), allowing a client to roam between APs in the same mobility domain. When a client decides to roam to a different AP in an FT network (in the same mobility domain), they first send an authentication request frame. This frame is either sent to the new AP (in over-the-air FT) or to the original AP (in over-the-DS FT). The authentication request frame includes the Fast BSS Transition Information Element (FT-IE) specifying the R0 key holder IDS (R0KH-ID) corresponding to the roam request. In response, the AP send back an authentication response frame, also containing an FT-IE. This FT-IE contains the regular fields (Anonce, Snonce, etc.) but also includes the R0KH-ID and R1KH-ID. This is done by encoding the additional fields as TLVs immediately after the structure of the FT-IE (but still within the bounds of the IE), like so: `` * * * | FT-IE Tag (55) | FT-IE Length | ... FT-IE Contents ... | Additional TLVs | * * * 0 1 2 84 2 + FT-IE Length `` On the BCM4339 SoC with firmware version 6.37.34.40 the authentication response frame for the FT roaming is handled by the ROM function 0x7B6A4. This function first retrieves the FT-IE. Then, it allocates a heap buffer for it, using the size specified in the IE's length field. The FT-IE is then stored in the allocated buffer, which is subsequently used to extract the R0KH-ID and R1KH-ID fields. Here is the high-level logic for this function: `` void function_7B6A4(...) { //Copying in the FT-IE char* ft_ie = bcm_parse_tlvs(auth_frame, auth_frame_len, 55); unsigned short ft_ie_len = ft_ie[1] + 2; char* ft_ie_buffer = malloc(ft_ie_len); memcpy(ft_ie_buffer, ft_ie, ft_ie_len); //Extracting the embedded IEs in the FT-IE. The size of The //FT-IE's fields without the embedded IEs is 84. char* ies = ft_ie_buffer + 84; int ies_length = ft_ie_len - 84; char* r0kh_id = bcm_parse_tlvs(ies, ies_length, 1); char* r1kh_id = bcm_parse_tlvs(ies, ies_length, 3); memcpy(..., ft_ie + 20, 0x20); //Copying the Anonce ... } `` First, it should be noted that the function erroneously assumes the size of the FT-IE is at least 84. An attacker could include a shorter FT-IE, causing the function to copy 0x20 bytes from (ft_ie + 20), which are stored as the AP's Anonce. Second, after extracting the R0KH-ID and R1KH-ID fields, the function proceeds to calculate the PTK. To do so, the value of PMK-R0 must first be derived. According to the IEEE 802.11 r-2008 - 8.5.1.5.3, the PMK-R0 is derived as follows: R0-Key-Data = KDF-384(XXKey, "FT-R0", SSIDlength || SSID || MDID || R0KHlength || R0KH-ID || S0KH-ID) PMK-R0 = L(R0-Key-Data, 0, 256) PMK-R0Name-Salt = L(R0-Key-Data, 256, 128) (see also "wpa_derive_pmk_r0" under https://w1.fi/cgit/hostap/plain/src/common/wpa_common.c) This calculation is performed by the ROM function 0x13C94, which uses the R0KH-ID that was parsed earlier from the FT-IE in the authentication response frame. The function has approximately the following logic: `void function_13C94(...) { char buffer[128]; ... memcpy(buffer, "FT-R0", strlen("FT-R0")); buffer += strlen("FT-R0"); memcpy(buffer, &ssid_length, 1); buffer += 1; memcpy(buffer, ssid, ssid_length); buffer += ssid_length; memcpy(buffer, &mdid, 2); buffer += 2; memcpy(buffer, r0kh_id, r0kh_id_len); buffer += rokh_id_len; ... }` Where "`r0kh_id`" is the contents of the R0KH-ID field that was extracted from the FT-IE, and "r0kh_id_len" is the length of the extracted field. Since the R0KH-ID field's length is not validated, an attacker can include an extremely long field within a crafted FT-IE (specifically, the R0KH-ID's length can be at most `MAX_IE_SIZE` \+ `IE_HEADER_SIZE` \- `FT_IE_SIZE` = 255 + 2 - 84 = 173). This would cause the stack-allocated buffer to be overflown, corrupting the stack with attacker-controlled data. id SSV:92896 last seen 2017-11-19 modified 2017-04-05 published 2017-04-05 reporter Root title Broadcom: Stack buffer overflow when handling 802.11r (FT) authentication response (CVE-2017-6975) bulletinFamily exploit description iOS 10.3.1 is now available and addresses the following: Wi-Fi Available for: iPhone 5 and later, iPad 4th generation and later, iPod touch 6th generation and later Impact: Impact: An attacker within range may be able to execute arbitrary code on the Wi-Fi chip Description: A stack buffer overflow was addressed through improved input validation. CVE-2017-6975: Gal Beniamini of Google Project Zero Installation note: This update is available through iTunes and Software Update on your iOS device, and will not appear in your computer's Software Update application, or in the Apple Downloads site. Make sure you have an Internet connection and have installed the latest version of iTunes from www.apple.com/itunes/ iTunes and Software Update on the device will automatically check Apple's update server on its weekly schedule. When an update is detected, it is downloaded and the option to be installed is presented to the user when the iOS device is docked. We recommend applying the update immediately if possible. Selecting Don't Install will present the option the next time you connect your iOS device. The automatic update process may take up to a week depending on the day that iTunes or the device checks for updates. You may manually obtain the update via the Check for Updates button within iTunes, or the Software Update on your device. To check that the iPhone, iPod touch, or iPad has been updated: * Navigate to Settings * Select General * Select About. The version after applying this update will be "10.3.1". Information will also be posted to the Apple Security Updates web site: https://support.apple.com/kb/HT201222 id SSV:92879 last seen 2017-11-19 modified 2017-04-04 published 2017-04-04 reporter Root title Apple iOS stack buffer overflow was addressed through improved input validation (CVE-2017-6975)
The Hacker News
| id | THN:206E97CDD774E71A98D1224F0230B8AF |
| last seen | 2018-01-27 |
| modified | 2017-04-05 |
| published | 2017-04-04 |
| reporter | Mohit Kumar |
| source | https://thehackernews.com/2017/04/iphone-ios-update.html |
| title | Update Your Apple Devices to iOS 10.3.1 to Avoid Being Hacked Over Wi-Fi |
References
- https://twitter.com/4Dgifts/status/849268365457850370
- https://support.apple.com/HT207688
- https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2017/04/over-air-exploiting-broadcoms-wi-fi_4.html
- http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/97328
- http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1038172
- http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2019/May/24
- https://support.apple.com/kb/HT210121
- https://seclists.org/bugtraq/2019/May/30