Vulnerabilities > CVE-2017-2783 - Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer vulnerability in Marklogic 8.06
Attack vector
LOCAL Attack complexity
LOW Privileges required
NONE Confidentiality impact
HIGH Integrity impact
HIGH Availability impact
HIGH Summary
An exploitable heap corruption vulnerability exists in the FillRowFormat functionality of Antenna House DMC HTMLFilter that is shipped with MarkLogic 8.0-6. A specially crafted xls file can cause a heap corruption resulting in arbitrary code execution. An attacker can send/provide malicious xls file to trigger this vulnerability.
Vulnerable Configurations
| Part | Description | Count |
|---|---|---|
| Application | 1 |
Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE)
Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC)
- Buffer Overflow via Environment Variables This attack pattern involves causing a buffer overflow through manipulation of environment variables. Once the attacker finds that they can modify an environment variable, they may try to overflow associated buffers. This attack leverages implicit trust often placed in environment variables.
- Overflow Buffers Buffer Overflow attacks target improper or missing bounds checking on buffer operations, typically triggered by input injected by an attacker. As a consequence, an attacker is able to write past the boundaries of allocated buffer regions in memory, causing a program crash or potentially redirection of execution as per the attackers' choice.
- Client-side Injection-induced Buffer Overflow This type of attack exploits a buffer overflow vulnerability in targeted client software through injection of malicious content from a custom-built hostile service.
- Filter Failure through Buffer Overflow In this attack, the idea is to cause an active filter to fail by causing an oversized transaction. An attacker may try to feed overly long input strings to the program in an attempt to overwhelm the filter (by causing a buffer overflow) and hoping that the filter does not fail securely (i.e. the user input is let into the system unfiltered).
- MIME Conversion An attacker exploits a weakness in the MIME conversion routine to cause a buffer overflow and gain control over the mail server machine. The MIME system is designed to allow various different information formats to be interpreted and sent via e-mail. Attack points exist when data are converted to MIME compatible format and back.
Seebug
| bulletinFamily | exploit |
| description | ### Summary An exploitable heap corruption vulnerability exists in the FillRowFormat functionality of AntennaHouse DMC HTMLFilter that is shipped with MarkLogic 8.0-6. A specially crafted xls file can cause a heap corruption resulting in arbitrary code execution. An attacker can send/provide malicious xls file to trigger this vulnerability. ### Tested Versions AntennaHouse DMC HTMLFilter shipped with MarkLogic 8.0-6 ``` fb1a22fa08c986ec3614284f4e912b0a /opt/MarkLogic/Converters/cvtofc/libdhf_rdoc.so 15b0acc464fba28335239f722a62037f /opt/MarkLogic/Converters/cvtofc/libdmc_comm.so 1eabb31236c675f9856a7d001b339334 /opt/MarkLogic/Converters/cvtofc/libdhf_rxls.so 1415cbc784f05db0e9db424636df581a /opt/MarkLogic/Converters/cvtofc/libdhf_comm.so 4ae366fbd4540dd4c750e6679eb63dd4 /opt/MarkLogic/Converters/cvtofc/libdmc_conf.so 81db1b55e18a0cb70a78410147f50b9c /opt/MarkLogic/Converters/cvtofc/libdhf_htmlif.so d716dd77c8e9ee88df435e74fad687e6 /opt/MarkLogic/Converters/cvtofc/libdhf_whtml.so e01d37392e2b2cea757a52ddb7873515 /opt/MarkLogic/Converters/cvtofc/convert ``` ### Product URLs https://www.antennahouse.com/antenna1/ ### CVSSv3 Score 8.3 - CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H ### Details This vulnerability is present in the AntennaHouse DMC HTMLFilter which is used, among others, to convert xls files to (x)html form. This product is mainly used by MarkLogic for xls document conversions as part of their web based document search and rendering engine. A specially crafted XLS file can lead to an heap corruption and ultimately to remote code execution. Let's investigate this vulnerability: after executing the XLS to html converter with malformed xls file as an input we can easily observe the following problem using Valgrind: ``` icewall@ubuntu:~/bugs/cvtofc_86$ valgrind ./convert config_xls/ ==30152== Memcheck, a memory error detector ==30152== Copyright (C) 2002-2013, and GNU GPL'd, by Julian Seward et al. ==30152== Using Valgrind-3.10.1 and LibVEX; rerun with -h for copyright info ==30152== Command: ./convert config_xls/ ==30152== input=/home/icewall/bugs/cvtofc_86/config_xls/toconv.xls output=/home/icewall/bugs/cvtofc_86/config_xls/conv.html type=2 info.options='0' Return from GetFileInfo=0 HtmlInfo.GroupName=UTF-8 HtmlInfo.DefLangName=English HtmlInfo.bBigEndian=0 HtmlInfo.options=0 HtmlInfo.SheetId=0 HtmlInfo.SlideId=0 HtmlInfo.lpFunc=(nil) HtmlInfo.szImageFolder= ==30152== Source and destination overlap in strcpy(0x43e178d, 0x43e178d) ==30152== at 0x402D56F: strcpy (in /usr/lib/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-x86-linux.so) ==30152== by 0x635186F: DHF_WOpen (in /home/icewall/bugs/cvtofc_86/libdhf_whtml.so) ==30152== by 0x4039779: FilterToHtml (in /home/icewall/bugs/cvtofc_86/libdhf_htmlif.so) ==30152== by 0x4038AFB: DHF_GetHtml_V11 (in /home/icewall/bugs/cvtofc_86/libdhf_htmlif.so) ==30152== by 0x8049AF7: main (in /home/icewall/bugs/cvtofc_86/convert) ==30152== ==30152== Invalid write of size 4 ==30152== at 0x403087D: memset (in /usr/lib/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-x86-linux.so) ==30152== by 0x404E896: FillRowFormat (in /home/icewall/bugs/cvtofc_86/libdhf_rxls.so) ==30152== by 0x4052633: FillCell (in /home/icewall/bugs/cvtofc_86/libdhf_rxls.so) ==30152== by 0x405327E: DHF_RGetObject (in /home/icewall/bugs/cvtofc_86/libdhf_rxls.so) ==30152== by 0x403979E: FilterToHtml (in /home/icewall/bugs/cvtofc_86/libdhf_htmlif.so) ==30152== by 0x4038AFB: DHF_GetHtml_V11 (in /home/icewall/bugs/cvtofc_86/libdhf_htmlif.so) ==30152== by 0x8049AF7: main (in /home/icewall/bugs/cvtofc_86/convert) ==30152== Address 0x57af9c8 is 0 bytes after a block of size 186,368 alloc'd ==30152== at 0x402C109: calloc (in /usr/lib/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-x86-linux.so) ==30152== by 0x42DCD24: DMC_calloc (in /home/icewall/bugs/cvtofc_86/libdmc_comm.so) ==30152== by 0x404101A: InitMem (in /home/icewall/bugs/cvtofc_86/libdhf_rxls.so) ==30152== by 0x40526BB: DHF_ROpen (in /home/icewall/bugs/cvtofc_86/libdhf_rxls.so) ==30152== by 0x4039765: FilterToHtml (in /home/icewall/bugs/cvtofc_86/libdhf_htmlif.so) ==30152== by 0x4038AFB: DHF_GetHtml_V11 (in /home/icewall/bugs/cvtofc_86/libdhf_htmlif.so) ==30152== by 0x8049AF7: main (in /home/icewall/bugs/cvtofc_86/convert) ``` We see that an out-of-bound write appears in the function `FillRowFormat` and spaced is allocated for the overflowed buffer in `InitMem`. Let's first investigate the place of allocation: ``` Line 1 signed int __cdecl InitMem(int a1) Line 2 { Line 3 _DWORD *v1; // esi@1 Line 4 int v2; // eax@1 Line 5 Line 6 v1 = *(_DWORD **)(a1 + 16164); Line 7 v1[74] = DMC_calloc(65538, 1); Line 8 v1[75] = DMC_calloc(65538, 1); Line 9 v1[76] = DMC_calloc(65538, 1); Line 10 v2 = DMC_calloc(256, 728); Line 11 *(_DWORD *)(a1 + 9236) = v2; Line 12 if ( !v1[76] || !v1[75] || !v1[74] || !v2 ) Line 13 return 12; Line 14 GetEndian(v1); Line 15 return 0; Line 16 } ``` Allocation of buffer overflowed in `FillRowFormat` takes place exactly at `line 10`. Calculating allocation size value : 256 * 728 = 186368 we see its equal to the value presented by valgrind. Of course an important fact to note is that this value is fixed. Switching to the place where overflow appears, we see the following situation: ``` Line 1 int __cdecl FillRowFormat(struct_a1 *a1) Line 2 { Line 3 (...) Line 4 v207 = -1; Line 5 v208 = -1; Line 6 v197 = a1->dword3F24; Line 7 qmemcpy(&v225, (const void *)(*(_DWORD *)(v197 + 1956) + (*(_DWORD *)(v197 + 1968) << 6) - 64), 0x40u); Line 8 memset(a1->pvoid2414, 0, 728 * (HIWORD(v226) - (unsigned __int16)v226)); Line 9 (...) ``` and information from the debugger: ``` [----------------------------------registers-----------------------------------] EAX: 0x1a0d EBX: 0xf774ec24 --> 0x1fb2c ECX: 0x0 EDX: 0x8aa9f5c --> 0x0 ESI: 0x8b1f6c8 --> 0x8aa1870 --> 0x750054 ('T') EDI: 0xffa185e0 --> 0xf7682420 --> 0x0 EBP: 0xffa185f8 --> 0xffa18688 --> 0xffa186b8 --> 0xffa186e8 --> 0xffa18ac8 --> 0xffa28e38 --> 0x0 ESP: 0xffa184b0 --> 0x8adc728 --> 0x0 EIP: 0xf7742892 --> 0xfefb8de8 EFLAGS: 0x292 (carry parity ADJUST zero SIGN trap INTERRUPT direction overflow) [-------------------------------------code-------------------------------------] 0xf7742887: push 0x0 0xf7742889: mov edx,DWORD PTR [ebp-0x9c] 0xf774288f: push DWORD PTR [edx+0x18] => 0xf7742892: call 0xf7732424 <memset@plt> 0xf7742897: add esp,0x10 0xf774289a: mov BYTE PTR [ebp-0x59],0x0 0xf774289e: mov WORD PTR [ebp-0x64],0x0 0xf77428a4: mov ecx,DWORD PTR [ebp-0x98] Guessed arguments: arg[0]: 0x8adc728 --> 0x0 arg[1]: 0x0 arg[2]: 0x5b2d8 ``` At line 8, we see the `Size` parameter of memset is the result of the multiplication of constant value 728 with the result of the subtraction of two WORD fields. In this case, its size is equal to 0x5b2d8 which is much higher than allocated space for this buffer ( 186368 == 0x2d800). Looking for initialization of these fields we land here: ``` (rr) rni $100 = 0x489a [----------------------------------registers-----------------------------------] EAX: 0x200 EBX: 0xf774ec24 --> 0x1fb2c ECX: 0x8b3b0b0 --> 0x0 EDX: 0x8b1f688 --> 0x8aa5d88 --> 0x750054 ('T') ESI: 0x8aabd10 --> 0x0 EDI: 0x8b1f688 --> 0x8aa5d88 --> 0x750054 ('T') EBP: 0xffa18688 --> 0xffa186b8 --> 0xffa186e8 --> 0xffa18ac8 --> 0xffa28e38 --> 0x0 ESP: 0xffa18660 --> 0x8aa000a --> 0x0 EIP: 0xf773a8e9 --> 0x42896640 EFLAGS: 0x206 (carry PARITY adjust zero sign trap INTERRUPT direction overflow) [-------------------------------------code-------------------------------------] 0xf773a8de: mov ax,WORD PTR [ecx+eax*8+0x4] 0xf773a8e3: cmp ax,WORD PTR [edx+0x1e] 0xf773a8e7: jb 0xf773a8ee => 0xf773a8e9: inc eax 0xf773a8ea: mov WORD PTR [edx+0x1e],ax 0xf773a8ee: sub esp,0x8 0xf773a8f1: mov eax,DWORD PTR [esi+0x9a4] 0xf773a8f7: mov edx,DWORD PTR [esi+0x9a0] [------------------------------------stack-------------------------------------] 0000| 0xffa18660 --> 0x8aa000a --> 0x0 0004| 0xffa18664 --> 0x8aac716 --> 0x1e1a 0008| 0xffa18668 --> 0x6 0012| 0xffa1866c --> 0xf773a10a --> 0x1ac3815b 0016| 0xffa18670 --> 0xb ('\x0b') 0020| 0xffa18674 --> 0x6 0024| 0xffa18678 --> 0xb ('\x0b') 0028| 0xffa1867c --> 0xf774ec24 --> 0x1fb2c [------------------------------------------------------------------------------] Legend: code, data, rodata, value Warning: not running or target is remote 0xf773a8e7 in NumberRec () from ./libdhf_rxls.so (rr) bt #0 0xf773a8e7 in NumberRec () from ./libdhf_rxls.so #1 0xf77472c5 in DHF_RGetObject () from ./libdhf_rxls.so #2 0xf775179f in FilterToHtml () from ./libdhf_htmlif.so #3 0xf7750afc in DHF_GetHtml_V11 () from ./libdhf_htmlif.so #4 0x08049af8 in main () #5 0xf74f0af3 in __libc_start_main (main=0x8049730 <main>, argc=0x2, argv=0xffa28ed4, init=0x8049f70 <__libc_csu_init>, fini=0x8049f60 <__libc_csu_fini>, rtld_fini=0xf7793160 <_dl_fini>, stack_end=0xffa28ecc) at libc-start.c:287 #6 0x08048ad1 in _start () ``` The value that we're interested in above is the register `eax`, which equals : 0x200. Looking at the pseudo code of the `NumberRec` function, we see the following: ``` Line 1 signed int __usercall NumberRec@<eax>(long double a1@<st0>, struct_a2 *a2) Line 2 { Line 3 (...) Line 4 *((_DWORD *)a2->pvoid9A0 + 6 * a2->dword9A4 + 2) = (unsigned __int16)Exc_GetWord(a2, a2->dword128); Line 5 *((_WORD *)a2->pvoid9A0 + 12 * a2->dword9A4 + 2) = Exc_GetWord(a2, a2->dword128 + 2);//XXX Line 6 *((_WORD *)a2->pvoid9A0 + 12 * a2->dword9A4 + 3) = Exc_GetWord(a2, a2->dword128 + 4); Line 7 *((_DWORD *)a2->pvoid9A0 + 6 * a2->dword9A4 + 3) = 0xFFFF; Line 8 *((_BYTE *)a2->pvoid9A0 + 24 * a2->dword9A4) = 1; Line 9 v5 = a2->dword7A4 + (a2->dword7B0 << 6) - 64; Line 10 v6 = *((_DWORD *)a2->pvoid9A0 + 6 * a2->dword9A4 + 2); Line 11 if ( v6 >= *(_DWORD *)(v5 + 24) ) Line 12 *(_DWORD *)(a2->dword7A4 + (a2->dword7B0 << 6) - 64 + 24) = v6 + 1; Line 13 v7 = a2->dword7A4 + (a2->dword7B0 << 6) - 64; Line 14 v8 = *((_WORD *)a2->pvoid9A0 + 12 * a2->dword9A4 + 2); //XXX Line 15 if ( v8 >= *(_WORD *)(v7 + 30) ) Line 16 *(_WORD *)(a2->dword7A4 + (a2->dword7B0 << 6) - 64 + 30) = v8 + 1;//XXX ``` Manipulations on 0x200 value are made at lines marked by an `//XXX` comment. As we can notice at `line 5` that value is read directly from the file via the `Exc_GetWord` function and later stored at `line 16`. During this entire procedure the value is checked once, at `line 15` whether its bigger than some field. There is NO CHECK for an upper limit. We know now, seeing the code above that the value used for memset as a size argument is read almost directly from the file. Looking for this value in our PoC file we can find it at offset : 0x3155. The entire record looks as follows: ``` 0x3150: 7E 02 0A 00 1B 00 00 02 1A 00 1A 1E 00 00 ``` which is : type : 0x27E Len : 0xA Data : 0x1B ... According to the documentation https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/office/cc313154(v=office.12).aspx, a record with type 0x27E is an https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/office/dd907549%28v=office.14%29.aspx?f=255&MSPPError=-2147217396. The 0x200 value is a `col (2 bytes): A Col structure that specifies a column index`. In the description for this we read: ``` An unsigned integer that specifies the zero-based column index of the column in the sheet that contains this structure. MUST be greater than or equal to the colMic field of the Dimensions record of the sheet that contains this structure and MUST be less than the colMac field of the Dimensions record of the sheet that contains this structure. MUST be less than or equal to 0x00FF. ``` We saw in the previous analysis that there was a check to see whether `col` is bigger than `colMic`, but that there was no check to ensure that `col` does not exceed `colMac` or 0x00FF, which led to the overflow. ### Crash Information ``` icewall@ubuntu:~/bugs/cvtofc_86$ valgrind ./convert config_xls/ ==30152== Memcheck, a memory error detector ==30152== Copyright (C) 2002-2013, and GNU GPL'd, by Julian Seward et al. ==30152== Using Valgrind-3.10.1 and LibVEX; rerun with -h for copyright info ==30152== Command: ./convert config_xls/ ==30152== input=/home/icewall/bugs/cvtofc_86/config_xls/toconv.xls output=/home/icewall/bugs/cvtofc_86/config_xls/conv.html type=2 info.options='0' Return from GetFileInfo=0 HtmlInfo.GroupName=UTF-8 HtmlInfo.DefLangName=English HtmlInfo.bBigEndian=0 HtmlInfo.options=0 HtmlInfo.SheetId=0 HtmlInfo.SlideId=0 HtmlInfo.lpFunc=(nil) HtmlInfo.szImageFolder= ==30152== Source and destination overlap in strcpy(0x43e178d, 0x43e178d) ==30152== at 0x402D56F: strcpy (in /usr/lib/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-x86-linux.so) ==30152== by 0x635186F: DHF_WOpen (in /home/icewall/bugs/cvtofc_86/libdhf_whtml.so) ==30152== by 0x4039779: FilterToHtml (in /home/icewall/bugs/cvtofc_86/libdhf_htmlif.so) ==30152== by 0x4038AFB: DHF_GetHtml_V11 (in /home/icewall/bugs/cvtofc_86/libdhf_htmlif.so) ==30152== by 0x8049AF7: main (in /home/icewall/bugs/cvtofc_86/convert) ==30152== ==30152== Invalid write of size 4 ==30152== at 0x403087D: memset (in /usr/lib/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-x86-linux.so) ==30152== by 0x404E896: FillRowFormat (in /home/icewall/bugs/cvtofc_86/libdhf_rxls.so) ==30152== by 0x4052633: FillCell (in /home/icewall/bugs/cvtofc_86/libdhf_rxls.so) ==30152== by 0x405327E: DHF_RGetObject (in /home/icewall/bugs/cvtofc_86/libdhf_rxls.so) ==30152== by 0x403979E: FilterToHtml (in /home/icewall/bugs/cvtofc_86/libdhf_htmlif.so) ==30152== by 0x4038AFB: DHF_GetHtml_V11 (in /home/icewall/bugs/cvtofc_86/libdhf_htmlif.so) ==30152== by 0x8049AF7: main (in /home/icewall/bugs/cvtofc_86/convert) ==30152== Address 0x57af9c8 is 0 bytes after a block of size 186,368 alloc'd ==30152== at 0x402C109: calloc (in /usr/lib/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-x86-linux.so) ==30152== by 0x42DCD24: DMC_calloc (in /home/icewall/bugs/cvtofc_86/libdmc_comm.so) ==30152== by 0x404101A: InitMem (in /home/icewall/bugs/cvtofc_86/libdhf_rxls.so) ==30152== by 0x40526BB: DHF_ROpen (in /home/icewall/bugs/cvtofc_86/libdhf_rxls.so) ==30152== by 0x4039765: FilterToHtml (in /home/icewall/bugs/cvtofc_86/libdhf_htmlif.so) ==30152== by 0x4038AFB: DHF_GetHtml_V11 (in /home/icewall/bugs/cvtofc_86/libdhf_htmlif.so) ==30152== by 0x8049AF7: main (in /home/icewall/bugs/cvtofc_86/convert) input=/home/icewall/bugs/cvtofc_86/config_xls/toconv.xls output=/home/icewall/bugs/cvtofc_86/config_xls/conv.html type=2 info.options='0' Return from GetFileInfo=0 HtmlInfo.GroupName=UTF-8 HtmlInfo.DefLangName=English HtmlInfo.bBigEndian=0 HtmlInfo.options=0 HtmlInfo.SheetId=0 HtmlInfo.SlideId=0 HtmlInfo.lpFunc=(nil) HtmlInfo.szImageFolder= Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault. [----------------------------------registers-----------------------------------] EAX: 0x0 EBX: 0x800 ECX: 0xb6b6 EDX: 0x0 ESI: 0xdffd8dc0 --> 0xdffdcfe4 --> 0x750054 ('T') EDI: 0xe0289000 --> 0x0 EBP: 0xfffec7f8 --> 0xfffec888 --> 0xfffec8b8 --> 0xfffec8e8 --> 0xfffeccc8 --> 0xffffd038 --> 0x0 ESP: 0xfffec6a4 --> 0xfffec7e0 --> 0x1 EIP: 0xf7e73a6a (rep stos DWORD PTR es:[edi],eax) EFLAGS: 0x10246 (carry PARITY adjust ZERO sign trap INTERRUPT direction overflow) [-------------------------------------code-------------------------------------] 0xf7e73a62: mov edx,ecx 0xf7e73a64: shr ecx,0x2 0xf7e73a67: and edx,0x3 => 0xf7e73a6a: rep stos DWORD PTR es:[edi],eax 0xf7e73a6c: je 0xf7e73a80 0xf7e73a6e: cmp edx,0x2 0xf7e73a71: jb 0xf7e73a7e 0xf7e73a73: mov WORD PTR [edi],ax [------------------------------------stack-------------------------------------] 0000| 0xfffec6a4 --> 0xfffec7e0 --> 0x1 0004| 0xfffec6a8 --> 0xf7fbbc24 --> 0x1fb2c 0008| 0xfffec6ac --> 0xf7faf897 (add esp,0x10) 0012| 0xfffec6b0 --> 0xe025b800 --> 0x0 0016| 0xfffec6b4 --> 0x0 0020| 0xfffec6b8 --> 0x5b2d8 0024| 0xfffec6bc --> 0xf7faf819 (pop ebx) 0028| 0xfffec6c0 --> 0x0 [------------------------------------------------------------------------------] Legend: code, data, rodata, value Stopped reason: SIGSEGV __memset_sse2_rep () at ../sysdeps/i386/i686/multiarch/memset-sse2-rep.S:325 325 ../sysdeps/i386/i686/multiarch/memset-sse2-rep.S: No such file or directory. gdb-peda$ gdb-peda$ exploitable Description: Access violation on destination operand Short description: DestAv (9/29) Hash: 4dcfa6cfd291115355bf95afddf87f0b.c014683870b53e5d81fdd2e9450d6883 Exploitability Classification: EXPLOITABLE Explanation: The target crashed on an access violation at an address matching the destination operand of the instruction. This likely indicates a write access violation, which means the attacker may control the write address and/or value. Other tags: AccessViolation (28/29) gdb-peda$ bt #0 __memset_sse2_rep () at ../sysdeps/i386/i686/multiarch/memset-sse2-rep.S:325 #1 0xf7faf897 in FillRowFormat () from ./libdhf_rxls.so #2 0xf7fb3634 in FillCell () from ./libdhf_rxls.so #3 0xf7fb427f in DHF_RGetObject () from ./libdhf_rxls.so #4 0xf7fc179f in FilterToHtml () from ./libdhf_htmlif.so #5 0xf7fc0afc in DHF_GetHtml_V11 () from ./libdhf_htmlif.so #6 0x08049af8 in main () #7 0xf7d60af3 in __libc_start_main (main=0x8049730 <main>, argc=0x2, argv=0xffffd0d4, init=0x8049f70 <__libc_csu_init>, fini=0x8049f60 <__libc_csu_fini>, rtld_fini=0xf7feb160 <_dl_fini>, stack_end=0xffffd0cc) at libc-start.c:287 #8 0x08048ad1 in _start () ``` ### Timeline * 2017-02-09 - Vendor Disclosure * 2017-05-04 - Public Release ### CREDIT * Discovered by Marcin 'Icewall' Noga of Cisco Talos. |
| id | SSV:96523 |
| last seen | 2017-11-19 |
| modified | 2017-09-19 |
| published | 2017-09-19 |
| reporter | Root |
| title | AntennaHouse DMC HTMLFilter FillRowFormat Code Execution Vulnerability(CVE-2017-2783) |
Talos
| id | TALOS-2017-0279 |
| last seen | 2019-05-29 |
| published | 2017-05-04 |
| reporter | Talos Intelligence |
| source | http://www.talosintelligence.com/vulnerability_reports/TALOS-2017-0279 |
| title | AntennaHouse DMC HTMLFilter FillRowFormat Code Execution Vulnerability |