Vulnerabilities > CVE-2016-9037 - Out-of-bounds Read vulnerability in Tarantool 1.7.2

047910
CVSS 7.5 - HIGH
Attack vector
NETWORK
Attack complexity
LOW
Privileges required
NONE
Confidentiality impact
NONE
Integrity impact
NONE
Availability impact
HIGH
network
low complexity
tarantool
CWE-125
nessus
NVD
Published: 2016-12-23
Updated: 2024-11-21

Summary

An exploitable out-of-bounds array access vulnerability exists in the xrow_header_decode function of Tarantool 1.7.2.0-g8e92715. A specially crafted packet can cause the function to access an element outside the bounds of a global array that is used to determine the type of the specified key's value. This can lead to an out of bounds read within the context of the server. An attacker who exploits this vulnerability can cause a denial of service vulnerability on the server.

Vulnerable Configurations

Part Description Count
Application
Tarantool
1

Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE)

Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC)

  • Overread Buffers
    An adversary attacks a target by providing input that causes an application to read beyond the boundary of a defined buffer. This typically occurs when a value influencing where to start or stop reading is set to reflect positions outside of the valid memory location of the buffer. This type of attack may result in exposure of sensitive information, a system crash, or arbitrary code execution.

Nessus

  • NASL familyFedora Local Security Checks
    NASL idFEDORA_2016-2D0C8BA781.NASL
    descriptionSecurity fix for CVE-2016-9036, CVE-2016-9037 Note that Tenable Network Security has extracted the preceding description block directly from the Fedora update system website. Tenable has attempted to automatically clean and format it as much as possible without introducing additional issues.
    last seen2020-06-05
    modified2016-12-22
    plugin id96055
    published2016-12-22
    reporterThis script is Copyright (C) 2016-2020 and is owned by Tenable, Inc. or an Affiliate thereof.
    sourcehttps://www.tenable.com/plugins/nessus/96055
    titleFedora 25 : msgpuck / tarantool (2016-2d0c8ba781)
    code
    #%NASL_MIN_LEVEL 80502
#
# (C) Tenable Network Security, Inc.
#
# The descriptive text and package checks in this plugin were  
# extracted from Fedora Security Advisory FEDORA-2016-2d0c8ba781.
#

include("compat.inc");

if (description)
{
  script_id(96055);
  script_version("3.5");
  script_set_attribute(attribute:"plugin_modification_date", value:"2020/06/04");

  script_cve_id("CVE-2016-9036", "CVE-2016-9037");
  script_xref(name:"FEDORA", value:"2016-2d0c8ba781");

  script_name(english:"Fedora 25 : msgpuck / tarantool (2016-2d0c8ba781)");
  script_summary(english:"Checks rpm output for the updated packages.");

  script_set_attribute(
    attribute:"synopsis", 
    value:"The remote Fedora host is missing one or more security updates."
  );
  script_set_attribute(
    attribute:"description", 
    value:
"Security fix for CVE-2016-9036, CVE-2016-9037

Note that Tenable Network Security has extracted the preceding
description block directly from the Fedora update system website.
Tenable has attempted to automatically clean and format it as much as
possible without introducing additional issues."
  );
  script_set_attribute(
    attribute:"see_also",
    value:"https://bodhi.fedoraproject.org/updates/FEDORA-2016-2d0c8ba781"
  );
  script_set_attribute(
    attribute:"solution", 
    value:"Update the affected msgpuck and / or tarantool packages."
  );
  script_set_cvss_base_vector("CVSS2#AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C");
  script_set_cvss3_base_vector("CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H");

  script_set_attribute(attribute:"plugin_type", value:"local");
  script_set_attribute(attribute:"cpe", value:"p-cpe:/a:fedoraproject:fedora:msgpuck");
  script_set_attribute(attribute:"cpe", value:"p-cpe:/a:fedoraproject:fedora:tarantool");
  script_set_attribute(attribute:"cpe", value:"cpe:/o:fedoraproject:fedora:25");

  script_set_attribute(attribute:"vuln_publication_date", value:"2016/12/23");
  script_set_attribute(attribute:"patch_publication_date", value:"2016/12/22");
  script_set_attribute(attribute:"plugin_publication_date", value:"2016/12/22");
  script_set_attribute(attribute:"generated_plugin", value:"current");
  script_end_attributes();

  script_category(ACT_GATHER_INFO);
  script_copyright(english:"This script is Copyright (C) 2016-2020 and is owned by Tenable, Inc. or an Affiliate thereof.");
  script_family(english:"Fedora Local Security Checks");

  script_dependencies("ssh_get_info.nasl");
  script_require_keys("Host/local_checks_enabled", "Host/RedHat/release", "Host/RedHat/rpm-list");

  exit(0);
}


include("audit.inc");
include("global_settings.inc");
include("rpm.inc");


if (!get_kb_item("Host/local_checks_enabled")) audit(AUDIT_LOCAL_CHECKS_NOT_ENABLED);
release = get_kb_item("Host/RedHat/release");
if (isnull(release) || "Fedora" >!< release) audit(AUDIT_OS_NOT, "Fedora");
os_ver = pregmatch(pattern: "Fedora.*release ([0-9]+)", string:release);
if (isnull(os_ver)) audit(AUDIT_UNKNOWN_APP_VER, "Fedora");
os_ver = os_ver[1];
if (! preg(pattern:"^25([^0-9]|$)", string:os_ver)) audit(AUDIT_OS_NOT, "Fedora 25", "Fedora " + os_ver);

if (!get_kb_item("Host/RedHat/rpm-list")) audit(AUDIT_PACKAGE_LIST_MISSING);


cpu = get_kb_item("Host/cpu");
if (isnull(cpu)) audit(AUDIT_UNKNOWN_ARCH);
if ("x86_64" >!< cpu && cpu !~ "^i[3-6]86$") audit(AUDIT_LOCAL_CHECKS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED, "Fedora", cpu);


flag = 0;
if (rpm_check(release:"FC25", reference:"msgpuck-1.1.3-1.fc25")) flag++;
if (rpm_check(release:"FC25", reference:"tarantool-1.6.9.52-1.fc25")) flag++;


if (flag)
{
  security_report_v4(
    port       : 0,
    severity   : SECURITY_HOLE,
    extra      : rpm_report_get()
  );
  exit(0);
}
else
{
  tested = pkg_tests_get();
  if (tested) audit(AUDIT_PACKAGE_NOT_AFFECTED, tested);
  else audit(AUDIT_PACKAGE_NOT_INSTALLED, "msgpuck / tarantool");
}
  • NASL familyFedora Local Security Checks
    NASL idFEDORA_2016-BADD014AFE.NASL
    descriptionSecurity fix for CVE-2016-9036, CVE-2016-9037 Note that Tenable Network Security has extracted the preceding description block directly from the Fedora update system website. Tenable has attempted to automatically clean and format it as much as possible without introducing additional issues.
    last seen2020-06-05
    modified2016-12-22
    plugin id96056
    published2016-12-22
    reporterThis script is Copyright (C) 2016-2020 and is owned by Tenable, Inc. or an Affiliate thereof.
    sourcehttps://www.tenable.com/plugins/nessus/96056
    titleFedora 24 : msgpuck / tarantool (2016-badd014afe)
    code
    #%NASL_MIN_LEVEL 80502
#
# (C) Tenable Network Security, Inc.
#
# The descriptive text and package checks in this plugin were  
# extracted from Fedora Security Advisory FEDORA-2016-badd014afe.
#

include("compat.inc");

if (description)
{
  script_id(96056);
  script_version("3.5");
  script_set_attribute(attribute:"plugin_modification_date", value:"2020/06/04");

  script_cve_id("CVE-2016-9036", "CVE-2016-9037");
  script_xref(name:"FEDORA", value:"2016-badd014afe");

  script_name(english:"Fedora 24 : msgpuck / tarantool (2016-badd014afe)");
  script_summary(english:"Checks rpm output for the updated packages.");

  script_set_attribute(
    attribute:"synopsis", 
    value:"The remote Fedora host is missing one or more security updates."
  );
  script_set_attribute(
    attribute:"description", 
    value:
"Security fix for CVE-2016-9036, CVE-2016-9037

Note that Tenable Network Security has extracted the preceding
description block directly from the Fedora update system website.
Tenable has attempted to automatically clean and format it as much as
possible without introducing additional issues."
  );
  script_set_attribute(
    attribute:"see_also",
    value:"https://bodhi.fedoraproject.org/updates/FEDORA-2016-badd014afe"
  );
  script_set_attribute(
    attribute:"solution", 
    value:"Update the affected msgpuck and / or tarantool packages."
  );
  script_set_cvss_base_vector("CVSS2#AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C");
  script_set_cvss3_base_vector("CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H");

  script_set_attribute(attribute:"plugin_type", value:"local");
  script_set_attribute(attribute:"cpe", value:"p-cpe:/a:fedoraproject:fedora:msgpuck");
  script_set_attribute(attribute:"cpe", value:"p-cpe:/a:fedoraproject:fedora:tarantool");
  script_set_attribute(attribute:"cpe", value:"cpe:/o:fedoraproject:fedora:24");

  script_set_attribute(attribute:"vuln_publication_date", value:"2016/12/23");
  script_set_attribute(attribute:"patch_publication_date", value:"2016/12/22");
  script_set_attribute(attribute:"plugin_publication_date", value:"2016/12/22");
  script_set_attribute(attribute:"generated_plugin", value:"current");
  script_end_attributes();

  script_category(ACT_GATHER_INFO);
  script_copyright(english:"This script is Copyright (C) 2016-2020 and is owned by Tenable, Inc. or an Affiliate thereof.");
  script_family(english:"Fedora Local Security Checks");

  script_dependencies("ssh_get_info.nasl");
  script_require_keys("Host/local_checks_enabled", "Host/RedHat/release", "Host/RedHat/rpm-list");

  exit(0);
}


include("audit.inc");
include("global_settings.inc");
include("rpm.inc");


if (!get_kb_item("Host/local_checks_enabled")) audit(AUDIT_LOCAL_CHECKS_NOT_ENABLED);
release = get_kb_item("Host/RedHat/release");
if (isnull(release) || "Fedora" >!< release) audit(AUDIT_OS_NOT, "Fedora");
os_ver = pregmatch(pattern: "Fedora.*release ([0-9]+)", string:release);
if (isnull(os_ver)) audit(AUDIT_UNKNOWN_APP_VER, "Fedora");
os_ver = os_ver[1];
if (! preg(pattern:"^24([^0-9]|$)", string:os_ver)) audit(AUDIT_OS_NOT, "Fedora 24", "Fedora " + os_ver);

if (!get_kb_item("Host/RedHat/rpm-list")) audit(AUDIT_PACKAGE_LIST_MISSING);


cpu = get_kb_item("Host/cpu");
if (isnull(cpu)) audit(AUDIT_UNKNOWN_ARCH);
if ("x86_64" >!< cpu && cpu !~ "^i[3-6]86$") audit(AUDIT_LOCAL_CHECKS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED, "Fedora", cpu);


flag = 0;
if (rpm_check(release:"FC24", reference:"msgpuck-1.1.3-1.fc24")) flag++;
if (rpm_check(release:"FC24", reference:"tarantool-1.6.9.52-1.fc24")) flag++;


if (flag)
{
  security_report_v4(
    port       : 0,
    severity   : SECURITY_HOLE,
    extra      : rpm_report_get()
  );
  exit(0);
}
else
{
  tested = pkg_tests_get();
  if (tested) audit(AUDIT_PACKAGE_NOT_AFFECTED, tested);
  else audit(AUDIT_PACKAGE_NOT_INSTALLED, "msgpuck / tarantool");
}

Seebug

bulletinFamilyexploit
description### Summary An exploitable out-of-bounds array access vulnerability exists in the `xrow_header_decode` function of Tarantool 1.7.2.0-g8e92715. A specially crafted packet can cause the function to access an element outside the bounds of a global array that is used to determine the type of the specified key's value. This can lead to an out of bounds read within the context of the server. An attacker who exploits this vulnerability can cause a denial of service vulnerability on the server. ### Tested Versions Tarantool 1.7.2-0-g8e92715 ### Product URLs https://github.com/tarantool/tarantool ### CVSSv3 Score 7.5 - CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H ### CWE CWE-125: Out-of-bounds Read ### Details Tarantool is an open-source lua-based application server. While primarily functioning as an application server, it is also capable of providing database-like features and providing an in-memory database which can be queried using a protocol based around the MsgPack serialization format. Tarantool is used by various service providers such as Mail.RU, or Badoo. Tarantool's protocol is based around the MsgPack serialization format. This protocol is used to encode specific request types which are then made against the server. Inside the header of this protocol is data encoded as a map type in which each key is represented by integers. Each of these integers are used to index into an array which is used to determine the type of the key that was specified. In the following code, the server will first read the length out of the MsgPack encoded packet. After reading the length, the server will create a new instance of a message using the `iproto_msg_new` function. Afterwards, this object will be passed onto the `iproto_decode_msg` function. ``` src/box/iproto.cc:601 /** Enqueue all requests which were read up. */ static inline void iproto_enqueue_batch(struct iproto_connection *con, struct ibuf *in) { bool stop_input = false; while (con->parse_size && stop_input == false) { ... /* Read request length. */ if (mp_typeof(*pos) != MP_UINT) { tnt_raise(ClientError, ER_INVALID_MSGPACK, "packet length"); } if (mp_check_uint(pos, in->wpos) >= 0) break; uint32_t len = mp_decode_uint(&pos); const char *reqend = pos + len; ... struct iproto_msg *msg = iproto_msg_new(con); ... msg->len = reqend - reqstart; /* total request length */ try { iproto_decode_msg(msg, &pos, reqend, &stop_input); cpipe_push_input(&tx_pipe, guard.release()); } catch (Exception *e) { ... } ... } ... } ``` At the very beginning of the `iproto_decode_msg` function, the server will call a wrapper named `xrow_header_decode_xc`. This wrapper will simply chain into the `xrow_header_decode` function. ``` src/box/iproto.cc:601 static void iproto_decode_msg(struct iproto_msg *msg, const char **pos, const char *reqend, bool *stop_input) { xrow_header_decode_xc(&msg->header, pos, reqend); // XXX: Call xrow_header_decode_xc wrapper assert(*pos == reqend); request_create(&msg->request, msg->header.type); msg->request.header = &msg->header; ... } src/box/xrow.h:152 static inline void xrow_header_decode_xc(struct xrow_header *header, const char **pos, const char *end) { if (xrow_header_decode(header, pos, end) < 0) // XXX: Continue onto xrow_header_decode diag_raise(); } ``` When inside the `xrow_header_decode` function, the server will first check to see if the MsgPack encoded data is not malformed in anyway. Once this is performed, the next part of the packet will be checked to see if it is of the MP_MAP type. Afterwards, the server will enter a loop which will iterate over the number of values that are stored within the map type. For each entry within the map type, the server will decode a key from the map and then use it as an index to a global array named `iproto_key_type`. This array contains 0x31 elements. If one of the keys that are encoded are an integer that is larger than this array, then the server will access an element outside the bounds of said array. ``` src/box/xrow.cc:46 int xrow_header_decode(struct xrow_header *header, const char **pos, const char *end) { memset(header, 0, sizeof(struct xrow_header)); const char *tmp = *pos; if (mp_check(&tmp, end) != 0) { error: diag_set(ClientError, ER_INVALID_MSGPACK, "packet header"); return -1; } if (mp_typeof(**pos) != MP_MAP) goto error; uint32_t size = mp_decode_map(pos); for (uint32_t i = 0; i < size; i++) { if (mp_typeof(**pos) != MP_UINT) goto error; unsigned char key = mp_decode_uint(pos); // XXX: Read integer from packet if (iproto_key_type[key] != mp_typeof(**pos)) // XXX: Use integer as element for array goto error; ... } ... } ``` ### Crash Information ``` $ ASAN_OPTIONS=halt_on_error=0 /usr/local/bin/tarantool /usr/local/bin/tarantool: version 1.7.2-0-g8e92715 type 'help' for interactive help tarantool> box.cfg{listen=57005} 2016-11-27 01:23:41.848 [61276] main/101/interactive C> version 1.7.2-0-g8e92715 2016-11-27 01:23:41.848 [61276] main/101/interactive C> log level 5 2016-11-27 01:23:41.848 [61276] main/101/interactive I> mapping 1073741824 bytes for tuple arena... 2016-11-27 01:23:41.990 [62486] iproto/102/iproto I> binary: started 2016-11-27 01:23:41.991 [62486] iproto/102/iproto I> binary: bound to 0.0.0.0:57005 2016-11-27 01:23:42.261 [62486] main/101/interactive I> initializing an empty data directory 2016-11-27 01:23:42.314 [62595] snapshot/101/main I> creating `./00000000000000000000.snap.inprogress' 2016-11-27 01:23:42.315 [62595] snapshot/101/main I> saving snapshot `./00000000000000000000.snap.inprogress' 2016-11-27 01:23:42.507 [62595] snapshot/101/main I> done 2016-11-27 01:23:42.697 [61276] main/101/interactive I> ready to accept requests --- ... tarantool> ================================================================= ==61276==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: global-buffer-overflow on address 0x000001192b72 at pc 0x4e522a bp 0x7f091c8f1fd0 sp 0x7f091c8f1fc8 READ of size 1 at 0x000001192b72 thread T1 (iproto) #0 0x4e5229 in xrow_header_decode(xrow_header*, char const**, char const*) /user/tarantool/src/box/xrow.cc:65 #1 0x4ca63a in iproto_enqueue_batch(iproto_connection*, ibuf*) /user/tarantool/src/box/iproto.cc:515 #2 0x4c3ac3 in iproto_connection_on_input(ev_loop*, ev_io*, int) /user/tarantool/src/box/iproto.cc:635 #3 0x113dd6e in ev_invoke_pending /user/tarantool/third_party/libev/ev.c:3176 #4 0x114071b in ev_run /user/tarantool/third_party/libev/ev.c:3576 #5 0xbc09af in cord_costart_thread_func /user/tarantool/src/fiber.c:1004 #6 0xbbafcf in cord_thread_func /user/tarantool/src/fiber.c:810 #7 0x7f09207dddc4 in start_thread (/lib64/libpthread.so.0+0x7dc4) #8 0x7f091fceacec in __clone (/lib64/libc.so.6+0xf6cec) 0x000001192b72 is located 46 bytes to the left of global variable '.str' from '/user/tarantool/src/box/iproto_constants.c' (0x1192ba0) of size 7 '.str' is ascii string 'SELECT' 0x000001192b72 is located 0 bytes to the right of global variable 'iproto_key_type' from '/user/tarantool/src/box/iproto_constants.c' (0x1192b40) of size 50 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: global-buffer-overflow /user/tarantool/src/box/xrow.cc:65 xrow_header_decode(xrow_header*, char const**, char const*) Shadow bytes around the buggy address: 0x00008022a510: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x00008022a520: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x00008022a530: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x00008022a540: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x00008022a550: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 =>0x00008022a560: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00[02]f9 0x00008022a570: f9 f9 f9 f9 07 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 07 f9 f9 f9 0x00008022a580: f9 f9 f9 f9 00 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 07 f9 f9 f9 0x00008022a590: f9 f9 f9 f9 07 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 05 f9 f9 f9 0x00008022a5a0: f9 f9 f9 f9 05 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 07 f9 f9 f9 0x00008022a5b0: f9 f9 f9 f9 05 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 00 00 00 00 Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap left redzone: fa Heap right redzone: fb Freed heap region: fd Stack left redzone: f1 Stack mid redzone: f2 Stack right redzone: f3 Stack partial redzone: f4 Stack after return: f5 Stack use after scope: f8 Global redzone: f9 Global init order: f6 Poisoned by user: f7 ASan internal: fe Thread T1 (iproto) created by T0 here: #0 0x47d542 in pthread_create (/usr/local/bin/tarantool+0x47d542) ==61276==ABORTING ``` ### Exploit Proof-of-Concept When first running the Tarantool application server, start a server by typing the following at the Tarantool prompt. This will start a server bound to TCP port 57005. ``` tarantool> box.cfg {listen=57005} ``` To run the provided proof-of-concept, simply run it with python as; ``` $ python poc host:port ``` When connecting to port 57005 on the server, Tarantool will first send a 128 byte greeting that has the following format: ``` <class greeting> [0] <instance pstr.string<char_t>[64] 'tarantool'> u'Tarantool 1.7.2 (Binary) 84ed9e83-f99c-478a-8357-02edb833e091 \n' [40] <instance pstr.string<char_t>[44] 'salt'> u'UT4DBDrpVTD9h0bl7utdZvAA79Go5EOKLV/F8P4yyJ0=' [6c] <instance pstr.string<char_t>[20] 'null'> u' \n' ``` After receiving this packet, one can then send the MsgPack encoded message that triggers the vulnerability. The MsgPack format has the capacity of encoding various atomic types such as integers, booleans, and strings as well as different container types such as arrays or map (key/value) types. When encoding a type, the first byte will dictate the type+size followed by the data representing the value. The first byte is a binary structure that determines the size of the type. For integral types, this structure may be one of the following. If the type is positive-fixint, then the bottom 7-bits represent the integer value. If the type is negative-fixint, then the bottom 5-bits represent the integer value. ``` positive-fixint(7b) negative-fixint(5b) type-enumeration(5b) 0xxxxxxx 111xxxxx 110xxxxx ``` If the integer type is larger than 7 bits, then the following enumerations will occupy the bottom 5 bits. Depending on the enumeration type, the next number of bytes will contain the integer encoded in big-endian form. ``` uint8 uint16 uint32 uint64 xxx01100 xxx01101 xxx01110 xxx01111 sint8 sint16 sint32 sint64 xxx10000 xxx10001 xxx10010 xxx10011 ``` If a container type such as a mapping-type is being specified, then it will have one of the following formats. If it's of a mapfix-type, then the bottom 4 bits represent the number of key/value pairs that follow. If a map16 or map32 is specified, then the first 3 bits will represent the type enumeration (110), and then the next 5 bits will represent one of the following enumerations. Immediately following the map16 or map32 byte will then be either a uint16 ot uint32 (respectively) that is encoded in big-endian form. Each of these container types will then be followed with a number of MsgPack encoded values. This number specifies the number of pairs (key/value) that compose the mapping type. ``` mapfix map16 map32 1000xxxx xxx11110 xxx11111 ``` Tarantool's protocol first begins with a MsgPack encoded integer which dictates the number of bytes that compose the header and body that follow. This integer can be encoded within any of the previous defined integral types. Within the provided proof-of-concept, the size has the following format: ``` <class mp.packet> 'size' [0] <instance mp.t_packet 'type'> {bits=8} mp.d_uint32 (0xce, 8) [1] <instance mp.d_uint32 'data'> {Value=+0x00000004 (4)} ``` Immediately following the size, are two MsgPack encoded mapping types. Within Tarantool's protocol, the mapping type will contain pairs of key/values where the keys are are MsgPack encoded integer types and can be any one of the previously defined types (mapfix, map16, map32). Within the provided proof-of-concept, the header will look like the following map: ``` <class mp.packet> 'header' [5] <instance mp.t_packet 'type'> {bits=8} mp.d_fixmap (0x81, 8) [6] <instance mp.d_fixmap 'data'> "\x32\xcc\x00" ``` The data of this type contains a list of pairs. If the key of any one of these pairs is larger than the length of the iprotokeytype global variable (0x31), then this vulnerability is being triggered. ``` <class mp.d_fixmap> 'data' [6] <instance mp.PackedIntegerHolder 'Length'> {ZeroSizedFixType=1} 1 (+0x1) [6] <instance dynamic.array(mp.packet,2) 'Value'> mp.packet[2] "\x32\xcc\x00" ``` In the provided proof-of-concept, this key is set to a positive-fixint of 0x32. It is prudent to note, that the type can be any one of the aforementioned integer types (positive-fixint, negative-fixint, uint8, uint16, uint32, uint64, sint8, sint16, sint32, sint64). ``` Key: <class mp.packet> '0' [6] <instance mp.t_packet 'type'> {bits=8} mp.d_positive_fixint (0x32, 8) [7] <instance mp.d_positive_fixint 'data'> {Value=50 (+0x32)} // XXX: Must be out-of-bounds of the iproto_key_type array. Value: <class mp.packet> '1' [7] <instance mp.t_packet 'type'> {bits=8} mp.d_uint8 (0xcc, 8) [8] <instance mp.d_uint8 'data'> {Value=+0x00 (0)} ``` ### Timeline * 2016-12-14 - Vendor Disclosure * 2016-12-16 - Public Release ### CREDIT * Discovered by the Cisco Talos Team
idSSV:96591
last seen2017-11-19
modified2017-09-26
published2017-09-26
reporterRoot
titleTarantool Key-type Denial Of Service Vulnerability(CVE-2016-9037)

Talos

idTALOS-2016-0255
last seen2019-05-29
published2016-12-16
reporterTalos Intelligence
sourcehttp://www.talosintelligence.com/vulnerability_reports/TALOS-2016-0255
titleTarantool Key-type Denial Of Service Vulnerability

References