Security News > 2007 > June > Spying on the spy: Raw Story interviews former FBI investigator Eric OâNeill
http://rawstory.com/news/2007/Spying_on_spy_Raw_Story_interviews_0612.html By Larisa Alexandrovna June 12, 2007 Agent's riveting account is basis for the film, Breach. [1] Ask anyone in the intelligence community who was the most damaging spy in US history and the answer comes quickly: Robert Hanssen, a senior FBI agent who spied for the Soviet Union â and, after the Cold War, for the Russians â on and off for a period of 15 years. While much of the information Hanssen provided to the Russians remains classified, what has been released to the public illustrates the real life meaning of treason. At various times throughout his double-agent career at the FBI, Hanssen served as the head of the Soviet Analytical Squad, the chief of the National Security Threat List Unit, part of the Bureauâs computer espionage squad, and even part of the State Departmentâs Office of Foreign Missions. By all accounts he was an outstanding computer technician, even a hacker according to some, and a brilliant analyst. But he was also as enigmatic a person as counter-intelligence has ever encountered. Hanssen was a devout Catholic, a member of the controversial and influential conservative religious group known as Opus Dei; he was fiercely anti-Communist, a good father, a good husband, and mostly an underachiever, seemingly by choice. At the same time, Hanssen was also selling the most sensitive information from across several US intelligence agencies to the Russians, making pornographic films of his unsuspecting wife and later showing them to his friends, and masturbating at work to images of screen goddesses such as Catherine Zeta-Jones. For the information he provided to the Russians, he got comparatively little compensation, roughly $1.4 million in cash and diamonds. According to a 2003 Department of Justice Inspector Generalâs report [2], what Hanssen sold included some of the most classified and guarded information in the US government: âDuring the next six years â the last stages of the Cold War â Hanssen delivered thousands of pages of highly classified documents and dozens of computer disks to the KGB detailing U.S. strategies in the event of nuclear war, major developments in military weapons technologies, identities of active and historical U.S. assets in the Soviet intelligence services, the locations of KGB defectors in the United States, analytical products from across the Intelligence Community, comprehensive budget and policy documents, and many other aspects of the Soviet counterintelligence program.â (A Review of the FBI's Performance in Deterring, Detecting, and Investigating the Espionage Activities of Robert Philip Hanssen) Although he managed to avoid detection for over 20 years, by 2000 an FBI task force was well in place and focusing exclusively on Hanssen. They only needed to catch him in the act of making what is called a dead drop for the Soviets. Enter Eric OâNeill, a 27 year old FBI investigator on the Bureauâs Special Surveillance Group, specializing in surveillance of terrorism suspects. OâNeill was assigned to be Hanssenâs assistant in a newly formed FBI computer squad. It was largely OâNeillâs attention to detail and confidence that provided the smoking gun needed to bring Hanssen in and led to his arrest on February 18, 2001. O'Neill on the film, Breach OâNeillâs riveting account of what transpired between himself and Hanssen over that final crucial period is the basis for the film Breach, released in theaters to high critical acclaim early this year. OâNeill is portrayed by Ryan Phillipe and Hanssen by Chris Cooper in an astonishing performance that, according to those who knew the spy, is chillingly accurate. RAW STORY's managing editor for investigative news and frequent reporter on intelligence and national security, Larisa Alexandrovna, caught up with OâNeill to discuss his role in the capture of Hanssen, the PROMIS software, the Valerie Plame leak, and other topics involving espionage and government secrecy. Even though O'Neill never had experience going face-to-face with a "target," he was trained as a "ghost," able to follow someone closely for weeks, "but you would never know I was there." Along with exposing the identities of foreign agents the US had "turned," According to O'Neill, Hanssen "gave the Russians our nuclear information, information about agents and assets working penetration, he even gave them the source code to the FBIâs automated case system program." Although he doesn't think there is any "correlation" between the Hanssen and Plame cases, O'Neill tells RAW STORY [3] "a journalist that knowingly or negligently releases/reveals classified information should face federal prosecution." O'Neill also believes "there are still moles in government agencies." "Iâd like to think that Hanssen was the last FBI mole, but thatâs probably wishful thinking," O'Neill said. "I do think that the Hanssen case made the FBI more sound â better able to screen for spies, and better able to catch them once they activate." O'Neill added, "I think there will always be spies, for the same reason there will always be crime. Some people are so morally broken they see no problem with taking the easy road at the cost of others." -=- FULL TRANSCRIPT OF O'NEILL INTERVIEW Raw Story: Nice to meet you, Eric. Eric OâNeill: Yes, nice to meet you as well RS: Letâs begin with the obvious question, for me anyway: Why were you picked to get close to Hanssen? You were not an FBI agent, but an operative for the FBI â working toward becoming an agent. Is that correct? EO: I was a member of a group of specialized FBI investigators called the SSG, Special Surveillance Group. It was [essentially] based on the [British] MI5 model⦠We were intelligence investigators in [the equivalent of] counterintelligence and handled such things as surveillance work ⦠using technology to target suspects, as well as penetration work, data collection, etc. RS: But you were on your way to becoming an agent? EO: Well, there are two separate tracks; you eventually hit a glass ceiling as an investigator. I originally applied to the FBI for the Special Agentâs class. At the time I was 22 years old and was told that 22 was too young to become a Special Agent. Instead, I was offered a position with the Special Surveillance Group â a group of specially trained counter intelligence and counter terrorism operatives who focus on clandestine vehicular and foot surveillance of foreign nationals and American citizens known or suspected of spying or terrorism. The FBI made a decision to create squads of SSG âInvestigative Specialistsâ in order to overcome an institutional problem that Special Agents have always had with surveillance. SSG are called ghosts. When an Investigative Specialist is âghostingâ a target, we are invisible. RS: And the schooling and training are comparable to that of Special Agents? EO: SSG are graduates of the FBI Academy in Quantico, VA, carry FBI credentials and badges, and conduct much of the same investigative work the Agents carry out. The singular distinctions are that SSG personnel do not carry firearms and do not make arrests. The goal of SSG is to follow a target without ever being seen. I eventually wanted to re-apply to Special Agentâs class, which would require me to return to the FBI Academy. [...] [1] http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/B000OYAT3U/c4iorg [2] http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/0308/index.htm [3] http://rawstory.com/
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