Vulnerabilities > CVE-2022-26493 - Improper Certificate Validation vulnerability in Drupal Saml SP 2.0 Single Sign on
Attack vector
NETWORK Attack complexity
LOW Privileges required
SINGLE Confidentiality impact
PARTIAL Integrity impact
PARTIAL Availability impact
PARTIAL Summary
Xecurify's miniOrange Premium, Standard, and Enterprise Drupal SAML SP modules possess an authentication and authorization bypass vulnerability. An attacker with access to a HTTP-request intercepting method is able to bypass authentication and authorization by removing the SAML Assertion Signature - impersonating existing users and existing roles, including administrative users/roles. This vulnerability is not mitigated by configuring the module to enforce signatures or certificate checks. Xecurify recommends updating miniOrange modules to their most recent versions. This vulnerability is present in paid versions of the miniOrange Drupal SAML SP product affecting Drupal 7, 8, and 9.
Vulnerable Configurations
| Part | Description | Count |
|---|---|---|
| Application | 1 |
Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE)
Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC)
- Creating a Rogue Certificate Authority Certificate An attacker exploits a weakness in the MD5 hash algorithm (weak collision resistance) to generate a certificate signing request (CSR) that contains collision blocks in the "to be signed" part. The attacker specially crafts two different, but valid X.509 certificates that when hashed with the MD5 algorithm would yield the same value. The attacker then sends the CSR for one of the certificates to the Certification Authority which uses the MD5 hashing algorithm. That request is completely valid and the Certificate Authority issues an X.509 certificate to the attacker which is signed with its private key. An attacker then takes that signed blob and inserts it into another X.509 certificate that the attacker generated. Due to the MD5 collision, both certificates, though different, hash to the same value and so the signed blob works just as well in the second certificate. The net effect is that the attackers' second X.509 certificate, which the Certification Authority has never seen, is now signed and validated by that Certification Authority. To make the attack more interesting, the second certificate could be not just a regular certificate, but rather itself a signing certificate. Thus the attacker is able to start their own Certification Authority that is anchored in its root of trust in the legitimate Certification Authority that has signed the attackers' first X.509 certificate. If the original Certificate Authority was accepted by default by browsers, so will now the Certificate Authority set up by the attacker and of course any certificates that it signs. So the attacker is now able to generate any SSL certificates to impersonate any web server, and the user's browser will not issue any warning to the victim. This can be used to compromise HTTPS communications and other types of systems where PKI and X.509 certificates may be used (e.g., VPN, IPSec) .