Vulnerabilities > CVE-2021-22815 - Information Exposure vulnerability in Schneider-Electric products

047910
CVSS 5.3 - MEDIUM
Attack vector
NETWORK
Attack complexity
LOW
Privileges required
NONE
Confidentiality impact
LOW
Integrity impact
NONE
Availability impact
NONE
network
low complexity
schneider-electric
CWE-200

Summary

A CWE-200: Information Exposure vulnerability exists which could cause the troubleshooting archive to be accessed. Affected Products: 1-Phase Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS) using NMC2 including Smart-UPS, Symmetra, and Galaxy 3500 with Network Management Card 2 (NMC2): AP9630/AP9630CH/AP9630J, AP9631/AP9631CH/AP9631J, AP9635/AP9635J (NMC2 AOS V6.9.8 and earlier), 3-Phase Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS) using NMC2 including Symmetra PX 250/500 (SYPX) Network Management Card 2 (NMC2): AP9630/AP9630CH/AP9630J, AP9631/AP9631CH/AP9631J, AP9635/AP9635J (NMC2 AOS V6.9.6 and earlier), 3-Phase Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS) using NMC2 including Symmetra PX 48/96/100/160 kW UPS (PX2), Symmetra PX 20/40 kW UPS (SY3P), Gutor (SXW, GVX), and Galaxy (GVMTS, GVMSA, GVXTS, GVXSA, G7K, GFC, G9KCHU): AP9630/AP9630CH/AP9630J, AP9631/AP9631CH/AP9631J, AP9635/AP9635CH (NMC2 AOS V6.9.6 and earlier), 1-Phase Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS) using NMC3 including Smart-UPS, Symmetra, and Galaxy 3500 with Network Management Card 3 (NMC3): AP9640/AP9640J, AP9641/AP9641J, AP9643/AP9643J (NMC3 AOS V1.4.2.1 and earlier), APC Rack Power Distribution Units (PDU) using NMC2 2G Metered/Switched Rack PDUs with embedded NMC2: AP84XX, AP86XX, AP88XX, AP89XX (NMC2 AOS V6.9.6 and earlier), APC Rack Power Distribution Units (PDU) using NMC3 2G Metered/Switched Rack PDUs with embedded NMC3: APDU99xx (NMC3 AOS V1.4.0 and earlier), APC 3-Phase Power Distribution Products using NMC2 Galaxy RPP: GRPPIP2X84 (NMC2 AOS V6.9.6 and earlier), Network Management Card 2 (NMC2) for InfraStruxure 150 kVA PDU with 84 Poles (X84P): PDPB150G6F (NMC2 AOS V6.9.6 and earlier), Network Management Card 2 for InfraStruxure 40/60kVA PDU (XPDU) PD40G6FK1-M, PD40F6FK1-M, PD40L6FK1-M, PDRPPNX10 M,PD60G6FK1, PD60F6FK1, PD60L6FK1, PDRPPNX10, PD40E5EK20-M, PD40H5EK20-M (NMC2 AOS V6.9.6 and earlier), Network Management Card 2 for Modular 150/175kVA PDU (XRDP): PDPM150G6F, PDPM150L6F, PDPM175G6H (NMC2 AOS V6.9.6 and earlier), Network Management Card 2 for 400 and 500 kVA (PMM): PMM400-ALA, PMM400-ALAX, PMM400-CUB, PMM500-ALA, PMM500-ALAX, PMM500-CUB (NMC2 AOS V6.9.6 and earlier), Network Management Card 2 for Modular PDU (XRDP2G): PDPM72F-5U, PDPM138H-5U, PDPM144F, PDPM138H-R, PDPM277H, PDPM288G6H (NMC2 AOS V6.9.6 and earlier), Rack Automatic Transfer Switches (ATS) Embedded NMC2: Rack Automatic Transfer Switches - AP44XX (ATS4G) (NMC2 AOS V6.9.6 and earlier), Network Management Card 2 (NMC2) Cooling Products: InRow Cooling for series ACRP5xx, ACRP1xx, ACRD5xx, and ACRC5xx SKUs (ACRP2G), InRow Cooling for series ACRC10x SKUs (RC10X2G), InRow Cooling for series ACRD6xx and ACRC6xx SKUs (ACRD2G), InRow Cooling Display for series ACRD3xx (ACRC2G), InRow Cooling for series ACSC1xx SKUs (SC2G), InRow Cooling for series ACRD1xx and ACRD2xx (ACRPTK2G), Ecoflair IAEC25/50 Air Economizer Display (EB2G), Uniflair SP UCF0481I, UCF0341I (UNFLRSP), Uniflair LE DX Perimeter Cooling Display for SKUs: IDAV, IDEV, IDWV, IUAV, IUEV, IUWV, IXAV, IXEV, IXWV, LDAV, LDEV, and LDWV (LEDX2G), Refrigerant Distribution Unit: ACDA9xx (RDU) (NMC2 AOS V6.9.6 and earlier), Environmental Monitoring Unit with embedded NMC2 (NB250): NetBotz NBRK0250 (NMC2 AOS V6.9.6 and earlier), and Network Management Card 2 (NMC2): AP9922 Battery Management System (BM4) (NMC2 AOS V6.9.6 and earlier)

Vulnerable Configurations

Part Description Count
OS
Schneider-Electric
2
Hardware
Schneider-Electric
53

Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE)

Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC)

  • Subverting Environment Variable Values
    The attacker directly or indirectly modifies environment variables used by or controlling the target software. The attacker's goal is to cause the target software to deviate from its expected operation in a manner that benefits the attacker.
  • Footprinting
    An attacker engages in probing and exploration activity to identify constituents and properties of the target. Footprinting is a general term to describe a variety of information gathering techniques, often used by attackers in preparation for some attack. It consists of using tools to learn as much as possible about the composition, configuration, and security mechanisms of the targeted application, system or network. Information that might be collected during a footprinting effort could include open ports, applications and their versions, network topology, and similar information. While footprinting is not intended to be damaging (although certain activities, such as network scans, can sometimes cause disruptions to vulnerable applications inadvertently) it may often pave the way for more damaging attacks.
  • Exploiting Trust in Client (aka Make the Client Invisible)
    An attack of this type exploits a programs' vulnerabilities in client/server communication channel authentication and data integrity. It leverages the implicit trust a server places in the client, or more importantly, that which the server believes is the client. An attacker executes this type of attack by placing themselves in the communication channel between client and server such that communication directly to the server is possible where the server believes it is communicating only with a valid client. There are numerous variations of this type of attack.
  • Browser Fingerprinting
    An attacker carefully crafts small snippets of Java Script to efficiently detect the type of browser the potential victim is using. Many web-based attacks need prior knowledge of the web browser including the version of browser to ensure successful exploitation of a vulnerability. Having this knowledge allows an attacker to target the victim with attacks that specifically exploit known or zero day weaknesses in the type and version of the browser used by the victim. Automating this process via Java Script as a part of the same delivery system used to exploit the browser is considered more efficient as the attacker can supply a browser fingerprinting method and integrate it with exploit code, all contained in Java Script and in response to the same web page request by the browser.
  • Session Credential Falsification through Prediction
    This attack targets predictable session ID in order to gain privileges. The attacker can predict the session ID used during a transaction to perform spoofing and session hijacking.