Vulnerabilities > CVE-2008-1106 - Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) vulnerability in multiple products

047910
CVSS 7.1 - HIGH
Attack vector
NETWORK
Attack complexity
MEDIUM
Privileges required
NONE
Confidentiality impact
NONE
Integrity impact
COMPLETE
Availability impact
NONE

Summary

The management interface in Akamai Client (formerly Red Swoosh) 3322 and earlier allows remote attackers to bypass authentication via an HTTP request that contains (1) no Referer header, or (2) a spoofed Referer header that matches an approved domain, which allows remote attackers to conduct cross-site request forgery (CSRF) attacks and force the client to download and execute arbitrary files.

Vulnerable Configurations

Part Description Count
Application
Akamai_Technologies
1
Application
Red_Swoosh
1

Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE)

Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC)

  • JSON Hijacking (aka JavaScript Hijacking)
    An attacker targets a system that uses JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) as a transport mechanism between the client and the server (common in Web 2.0 systems using AJAX) to steal possibly confidential information transmitted from the server back to the client inside the JSON object by taking advantage of the loophole in the browser's Same Origin Policy that does not prohibit JavaScript from one website to be included and executed in the context of another website. An attacker gets the victim to visit his or her malicious page that contains a script tag whose source points to the vulnerable system with a URL that requests a response from the server containing a JSON object with possibly confidential information. The malicious page also contains malicious code to capture the JSON object returned by the server before any other processing on it can take place, typically by overriding the JavaScript function used to create new objects. This hook allows the malicious code to get access to the creation of each object and transmit the possibly sensitive contents of the captured JSON object to the attackers' server. There is nothing in the browser's security model to prevent the attackers' malicious JavaScript code (originating from attacker's domain) to set up an environment (as described above) to intercept a JSON object response (coming from the vulnerable target system's domain), read its contents and transmit to the attackers' controlled site. The same origin policy protects the domain object model (DOM), but not the JSON.
  • Cross-Domain Search Timing
    An attacker initiates cross domain HTTP / GET requests and times the server responses. The timing of these responses may leak important information on what is happening on the server. Browser's same origin policy prevents the attacker from directly reading the server responses (in the absence of any other weaknesses), but does not prevent the attacker from timing the responses to requests that the attacker issued cross domain. For GET requests an attacker could for instance leverage the "img" tag in conjunction with "onload() / onerror()" javascript events. For the POST requests, an attacker could leverage the "iframe" element and leverage the "onload()" event. There is nothing in the current browser security model that prevents an attacker to use these methods to time responses to the attackers' cross domain requests. The timing for these responses leaks information. For instance, if a victim has an active session with their online e-mail account, an attacker could issue search requests in the victim's mailbox. While the attacker is not able to view the responses, based on the timings of the responses, the attacker could ask yes / no questions as to the content of victim's e-mails, who the victim e-mailed, when, etc. This is but one example; There are other scenarios where an attacker could infer potentially sensitive information from cross domain requests by timing the responses while asking the right questions that leak information.
  • Cross Site Identification
    An attacker harvests identifying information about a victim via an active session that the victim's browser has with a social networking site. A victim may have the social networking site open in one tab or perhaps is simply using the "remember me" feature to keep his or her session with the social networking site active. An attacker induces a payload to execute in the victim's browser that transparently to the victim initiates a request to the social networking site (e.g., via available social network site APIs) to retrieve identifying information about a victim. While some of this information may be public, the attacker is able to harvest this information in context and may use it for further attacks on the user (e.g., spear phishing). In one example of an attack, an attacker may post a malicious posting that contains an image with an embedded link. The link actually requests identifying information from the social networking site. A victim who views the malicious posting in his or her browser will have sent identifying information to the attacker, as long as the victim had an active session with the social networking site. There are many other ways in which the attacker may get the payload to execute in the victim's browser mainly by finding a way to hide it in some reputable site that the victim visits. The attacker could also send the link to the victim in an e-mail and trick the victim into clicking on the link. This attack is basically a cross site request forgery attack with two main differences. First, there is no action that is performed on behalf of the user aside from harvesting information. So standard CSRF protection may not work in this situation. Second, what is important in this attack pattern is the nature of the data being harvested, which is identifying information that can be obtained and used in context. This real time harvesting of identifying information can be used as a prelude for launching real time targeted social engineering attacks on the victim.
  • Cross Site Request Forgery (aka Session Riding)
    An attacker crafts malicious web links and distributes them (via web pages, email, etc.), typically in a targeted manner, hoping to induce users to click on the link and execute the malicious action against some third-party application. If successful, the action embedded in the malicious link will be processed and accepted by the targeted application with the users' privilege level. This type of attack leverages the persistence and implicit trust placed in user session cookies by many web applications today. In such an architecture, once the user authenticates to an application and a session cookie is created on the user's system, all following transactions for that session are authenticated using that cookie including potential actions initiated by an attacker and simply "riding" the existing session cookie.

Nessus

NASL familyWindows
NASL idREDSWOOSH_3333.NASL
descriptionThe remote host is running Akamai Red Swoosh client, which handles software distribution via the Swoosh network. The version of Red Swoosh installed on the remote host includes a web server that listens on the loopback interface for management commands but it fails to properly sanitize the HTTP Referer header. By tricking a user on the affected host into visiting a specially crafted web page, an attacker can leverage this issue to cause files from arbitrary URLs to be downloaded and executed on the remote host subject to the user
last seen2020-06-01
modified2020-06-02
plugin id33126
published2008-06-09
reporterThis script is Copyright (C) 2008-2018 Tenable Network Security, Inc.
sourcehttps://www.tenable.com/plugins/nessus/33126
titleAkamai Red Swoosh < 3333 referer Header Cross-Site Request Forgery
code
#
# (C) Tenable Network Security, Inc.
#


include("compat.inc");

if (description)
{
  script_id(33126);
  script_version("1.13");
  script_cvs_date("Date: 2018/11/15 20:50:28");

  script_cve_id("CVE-2008-1106");
  script_bugtraq_id(29587);
  script_xref(name:"Secunia", value:"30135");

  script_name(english:"Akamai Red Swoosh < 3333 referer Header Cross-Site Request Forgery");
  script_summary(english:"Checks registry for version of Red Swoosh DLL");

 script_set_attribute(attribute:"synopsis", value:
"A remote Windows host contains a program that is affected by a
cross-site request forgery vulnerability.");
 script_set_attribute(attribute:"description", value:
"The remote host is running Akamai Red Swoosh client, which handles
software distribution via the Swoosh network.

The version of Red Swoosh installed on the remote host includes a web
server that listens on the loopback interface for management commands
but it fails to properly sanitize the HTTP Referer header. By tricking
a user on the affected host into visiting a specially crafted web
page, an attacker can leverage this issue to cause files from
arbitrary URLs to be downloaded and executed on the remote host
subject to the user's privileges.");
 script_set_attribute(attribute:"see_also", value:"https://secuniaresearch.flexerasoftware.com/secunia_research/2008-19/advisory/");
 script_set_attribute(attribute:"see_also", value:"https://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/493170/30/0/threaded" );
 script_set_attribute(attribute:"solution", value:"Update to Red Swoosh version 3333 or later.");
 script_set_cvss_base_vector("CVSS2#AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:P/A:N");
 script_set_cvss_temporal_vector("CVSS2#E:U/RL:OF/RC:C");
 script_set_attribute(attribute:"exploitability_ease", value:"No known exploits are available");
 script_set_attribute(attribute:"exploit_available", value:"false");
 script_cwe_id(287,352);

 script_set_attribute(attribute:"plugin_publication_date", value:"2008/06/09");

 script_set_attribute(attribute:"plugin_type", value:"local");
 script_end_attributes();

  script_category(ACT_GATHER_INFO);
  script_family(english:"Windows");

  script_copyright(english:"This script is Copyright (C) 2008-2018 Tenable Network Security, Inc.");

  script_dependencies("smb_enum_services.nasl", "smb_hotfixes.nasl");
  script_require_keys("SMB/Registry/Enumerated");
  script_require_ports(139, 445);

  exit(0);
}


include("audit.inc");
include("global_settings.inc");
include("smb_func.inc");


if (!get_kb_item("SMB/Registry/Enumerated")) exit(1, "KB 'SMB/Registry/Enumerated' not set to TRUE.");


# Make sure the Akamai service is running, unless we're being paranoid.
if (report_paranoia < 2)
{
  services = get_kb_item("SMB/svcs");
  if (!services || "Akamai" >!< services) exit(0);
}


# Connect to the appropriate share.
port    =  kb_smb_transport();
login   =  kb_smb_login();
pass    =  kb_smb_password();
domain  =  kb_smb_domain();

if(! smb_session_init()) audit(AUDIT_FN_FAIL, "smb_session_init");

rc = NetUseAdd(login:login, password:pass, domain:domain, share:"IPC$");
if (rc != 1)
{
  NetUseDel();
  audit(AUDIT_SHARE_FAIL,"IPC$");
}


# Connect to remote registry.
hklm = RegConnectRegistry(hkey:HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE);
if (isnull(hklm))
{
  NetUseDel();
  audit(AUDIT_REG_FAIL);
}


# Find the service dll.
dll = NULL;

key = "SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Akamai\Parameters";
key_h = RegOpenKey(handle:hklm, key:key, mode:MAXIMUM_ALLOWED);
if (!isnull(key_h))
{
  value = RegQueryValue(handle:key_h, item:"ServiceDll");
  if (!isnull(value)) dll = value[1];

  RegCloseKey(handle:key_h);
}
RegCloseKey(handle:hklm);
if (isnull(dll))
{
  NetUseDel();
  exit(0);
}


# Make sure the dll exists.
share = ereg_replace(pattern:"^([A-Za-z]):.*", replace:"\1$", string:dll);
dll2 =  ereg_replace(pattern:"^[A-Za-z]:(.*)", replace:"\1", string:dll);
NetUseDel(close:FALSE);

rc = NetUseAdd(login:login, password:pass, domain:domain, share:share);
if (rc != 1)
{
  NetUseDel();
  audit(AUDIT_SHARE_FAIL,share);
}

fh = CreateFile(
  file:dll2,
  desired_access:GENERIC_READ,
  file_attributes:FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL,
  share_mode:FILE_SHARE_READ,
  create_disposition:OPEN_EXISTING
);
version = NULL;
if (!isnull(fh))
{
  CloseFile(handle:fh);

  # Take the version number from the filename itself.
  if (eregmatch(pattern:"^.+rswin_([0-9]+)\.dll$", string:dll))
    version = ereg_replace(pattern:"^.+rswin_([0-9]+)\.dll$", replace:"\1", string:dll);
}
NetUseDel();


# Check the version number.
if (!isnull(version))
{
  if (int(version) < 3333)
  {
    if (report_verbosity)
    {
      path = ereg_replace(pattern:"^(.+)\\rswin_[0-9]+\.dll$", replace:"\1", string:dll);
      report = string(
        "\n",
        "Akamai Red Swoosh version ", version, " is installed under :\n",
        "\n",
        "  ", path, "\n"
      );
      security_warning(port:port, extra:report);
    }
    else security_warning(port);
    set_kb_item(name: 'www/0/XSS', value: TRUE);	# Maybe integrist...
  }
}

Seebug

bulletinFamilyexploit
descriptionCVE(CAN) ID: CVE-2008-1106 Red Swoosh是分布式的联网软件,用于增强文件传送和音频流功能。 Red Swoosh客户端在9421/TCP端口的环回接口上实现一个Web服务器监听管理命令。在这个接口上的授权是基于HTTP referer头的,referer头中包含有一些域的请求或没有referer的请求都可以获得授权。如果恶意站点伪造了HTTP referer的话,就会导致下载并执行任意URL的文件。 Akamai Red Swoosh 3322 Akamai ------ 目前厂商已经发布了升级补丁以修复这个安全问题,请到厂商的主页下载: <a href=http://www.akamai.com/html/redswoosh/overview.html target=_blank>http://www.akamai.com/html/redswoosh/overview.html</a>
idSSV:3396
last seen2017-11-19
modified2008-06-11
published2008-06-11
reporterRoot
titleAkamai Red Swoosh跨站请求伪造漏洞